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STRUCTURAL INTERPRETATION AND
THE NEW FEDERALISM:
FINDING THE PROPER BALANCE
BETWEEN STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND
FEDERAL SUPREMACY
CASEY L. WESTOVER*
In a series of cases that have come to be known as the "new
federalism," five members of the current Supreme Court, led by Chief
Justice William Rehnquist, have resurrected the concept of federalism in
constitutional law. These cases represent a significant shift in the
Court's approach to the federal-state balance. From the well known
"switch in time that saved nine,"' clearing the way for President
Roosevelt's New Deal legislation, federalism concerns had been largely
dormant in the Court's decisions. In fact, during the interim, at least
one prominent scholar questioned whether there any longer was a
constitutional law of federalism.2 In light of the new federalism cases,
* Associate, Sachnoff & Weaver Ltd. I would like to thank all of the people who
reviewed drafts of this article, including Lisa Westover, Greg Rowland, Mary Ann Rekuc,
Jeremy Paris, and Dan Rosenberg. I would also like to thank the staff of the Marquette Law
Review for agreeing to publish it and for helping to round it into final form.
1. Honorable William H. Rehnquist, Judicial Independence, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 579,
594 (2004) (quoting FRED R. SHAPIRO, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL
QUOTATIONS 393 (1933)). Justice Roberts voted with a five justice majority to uphold New
Deal legislation in National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1 (1937) and West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) and is commonly perceived as
having switched his vote from prior cases striking down New Deal legislation. On the switch
generally, and President Roosevelt's Court packing plan that was thought to have provoked
it, see Rehnquist supra.
2. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., PERSPECTIVES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 25 (1970)
(arguing that if there is no implied limit on the scope of federal power reserving certain
matters to the states, "the concept of legally defined federalism, judicially umpired, has.., no
substance").
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few would pose that question today; the Court has relied on a number of
distinct doctrines over the last fifteen years to strike down congressional
statutes in the name of federalism. Of course, there is no specific
"federalism" clause in the Constitution. To justify its decisions,
therefore, the Court has relied on other interpretive tools, applying
principles derived from the Constitution's history and structure. In this
article, I focus on the latter method-invocation of general
constitutional principles derived from the Constitution's structure. This
approach, known as "structuralism" or "structural reasoning/analysis,"
is hardly a novel invention of the Rehnquist Court. In fact, examples of
structural reasoning in constitutional interpretation can be found
throughout our nation's history and as early as the first Congress.' In
the new federalism cases, both the majority and the dissenters rely on
structural arguments to support their positions.
Structuralism is a perfectly legitimate and often enlightening
interpretive tool that balances two competing premises of written
constitutionalism, adherence to the Constitution's text and sufficient
flexibility to apply across time as circumstances evolve. But like any
interpretive methodology, structural interpretation must be done well,
and the structural arguments offered by both the majority and the
dissenters in the new federalism cases have been fundamentally flawed.
Before relying on a principle pulled from the Constitution, an
interpreter must read the document holistically to ensure that the
principle is consistent with the entire Constitution. Read as a whole, the
Constitution requires a balanced approach to federalism that takes
account of two countervailing principles-state sovereignty and federal
supremacy. In the new federalism cases, however, the majority relies
exclusively on the state sovereignty principle, using it to strike down
various laws that somehow impose upon the states. The dissenters, on
the other hand, focus solely on the federal supremacy principle and
therefore consistently vote to uphold the challenged federal action. By
focusing on one principle, to the exclusion of the other, both the
majority and the dissenters have failed to consider the Constitution's
true structure.
Parts I through III of this Article address structural interpretation
generally, looking more closely at what it is, how it is applied, and why it
is legitimate. Part IV describes the new federalism's state
3. See Kent Greenfeld, Original Penumbras: Constitutional Interpretation in the First
Year of Congress, 26 CONN. L. REV. 79, 93-97 (1993) (evaluating use of underlying principles
as interpretive methodology employed by first Congress).
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sovereignty/federal supremacy debate in context, and Part V critiques
the Court's structural analysis, arguing that both the majority and the
dissenters have failed to accurately capture the Constitution's structure.
Where each side invokes either state sovereignty or federal supremacy,
both should instead consider how these two countervailing principles
interact with one another. Under this balanced approach to federalism,
supremacy will normally prevail where Congress has acted within the
scope of its enumerated powers and state sovereignty where Congress
acts outside its delegated sphere. In each case, however, the Court
should weigh the relative sovereignty and supremacy interests at stake
and determine whether to depart from the general rule.
I. WHAT IS STRUCTURALISM?
Before beginning an analysis of structural interpretation and its
application in the federalism revival of the last fifteen years, it is
important to pin down what structural interpretation is, as the term has
been used in two seemingly different ways. The first of these refers to a
method of deriving constitutional rules from the relationships and
interactions between various constitutional institutions, or "structures,"
and was championed by Professor Charles L. Black, Jr. in his book,
Structure & Relationship in Constitutional Law.4 Black believed that the
Warren Court's individual rights decisions relied on strained
interpretations of precedents or particular constitutional texts and could
be better justified using a forgotten interpretive method he called
"inference from structure."5 His interpretations build "inferences from
the existence of constitutional structures and the relationships which the
Constitution ordains among" them.6  The method can best be
demonstrated through Black's own central example of a case that,
though rightly decided, could have been better justified on structural
grounds-Carrington v. Rash.7
Carrington involved a provision of the Texas Constitution
prohibiting any member of the armed forces who moved to Texas
4. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE & RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1969). The book was adapted from Professor Black's White Lectures on Citizenship at
Louisiana State University in 1968.
5. Id. See also PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 77-78 (1982) (discussing
Black's structural method of interpretation).
6. BOBBITT, supra note 5, at 74; see also BLACK, supra note 4, at 7 (describing "method
of inference from the structures and relationships created by the constitution in all its parts or
in some principle part").
7. 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
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during the course of military service from voting while still in the
military.8 The Supreme Court held that the provision violated the Equal
Protection Clause because it denied all military personnel a
fundamental right with only a remote administrative benefit to the
state Black, however, felt the Court's rationale was unsatisfying, and
believed the decision could be better justified by reasoning that the law
offended the "structure of the federal union.""' The Constitution
creates a federal structure, comprised of both the federal government
and the state governments. No state, he believed, should be allowed to
''annex any disadvantage simply and solely to the performance of a
federal duty," as doing so interferes with "the relation of the federal to
state governments.''
Modern scholars, while often citing Black to justify the use of
structural interpretation, tend to define the concept differently, referring
to inferences or principles that can be derived from the structure of the
document. For example, Professor Laurence Tribe has described
"structural inference" as searching for answers to constitutional
questions in the document's "patterns and premises, layout and logic,
assumptions and animating principles,"'2 and Professor Akhil Reed
Amar has described it as reading "the document holistically and
attend[ing] to its overarching themes."'3  The principles or themes
derived from the Constitution can help give meaning to ambiguous
constitutional texts14 or answer questions not directly addressed by the
8. Id. at 89.
9. Id. at 96.
10. BLACK, supra note 4, at 10-11.
11. Id. at 11.
12. Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges or Immunities Revival
Portend the Future-or Reveal the Structure of the Present, 113 HARV. L. REV. 110, 110 n.3
(1999) (evaluating the Rehnquist Court's willingness to employ structural reasoning in some
contexts but not others).
13. Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV.
26, 30 (2000) (arguing that doctrinal arguments are over-employed at the expense of textual
or "documentarian" arguments). Other scholars, describing the same interpretive tool, have
called it by different names. See, e.g, Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation: Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer and Our Bifurcated Constitution, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1259, 1281 (2001) (defining holism
as "an approach that seeks to take into account the basic structure and values of the
Constitution in the interpretation of all of its provisions"); Glenn H. Reynolds, Penumbral
Reasoning on the Right, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1333, 1335-37 (1992) (defining "penumbral
reasoning" as extracting common ideas from constitutional provisions and applying the idea
to other topics).
14. See Ernest A. Young, Alden v. Maine and the Jurisprudence of Structure, 41 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1601, 1631-32 (2000) (noting that the "meaning of a particular term in the
Constitution" can be derived using "a broader set of constitutional purposes and principles").
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text. 5 In this sense structuralism refers to the structure of the document
itself, not to the relationships between structures it creates.
On the surface it appears that Professor Black's structuralism is a
particular application of the broader structuralism espoused by others-
the relationship between the federal government and the states,
federalism, is a broad principle that can be derived from the
Constitution read as a whole. Upon closer evaluation, however, the
differences between the two methods disappear entirely. The
Constitution is a foundational document; its purpose is to recognize
existing structures and to create new ones, and to govern the
relationships between them.16 Therefore, any theme or principle that
can fairly be derived from the Constitution will necessarily relate to
some structure or to a relationship between structures. Seen in this
light, the two definitions do not represent distinct concepts, but instead
describe the same interpretive method from slightly different vantage
points.
Why then have scholars pulled away from Black's definition and
employed the seemingly broader themes and principles concept? There
are two possible explanations. One answer may be that structural
interpretation is easier to conceptualize when viewed in this way. It is
easier to say that retention of a legislative veto violates the principle of
One example of this sort of reasoning is the Supreme Court's use of broad principles such as
democracy and republicanism to help define the contours of the First Amendment. See First
Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 781-83 (1978); Tribe, supra note 12, at 160-61 n.245
(citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the judgment) ("[T]he First Amendment embodies more than a commitment to
free expression and communicative interchange for their own sakes; it has a structural role to
play in securing and fostering our republican system of self-government.").
15. Examples of this application of structural interpretation include fundamental rights
cases typified by Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and the anticommandeering
cases Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992). The structural aspects of all three cases are discussed at length infra.
16. Cf. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2-3, at 126 (3d ed.
2000) ("[N]othing lies closer to the core of constitutional law-law that constitutes (that, in its
Latin roots, causes things to come together and stand up)."); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text
and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108
HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1235 (1995). In the words of Professor Laurence Tribe:
To understand the Constitution as a legal text, it is essential to recognize the sort of
text it is: a constitutive text that purports, in the name of the People of the United
States of America, to bring into being a number of distinct but interrelated
institutions and practices, at once legal and political, and to define the rules
governing those institutions and practices.
2005]
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separation of powers 7 than to say that it would offend the relationship
between the legislative and executive branches of government, which is
characterized by the separation of powers. The first employs the
interpretive principle directly while the second requires an intervening
step, though the same concept does the work in each. Of course, this
does not mean that saying "separation of powers" answers the question.
When articulating a structural argument one must be careful to spell out
the underlying basis of the theme/relationship employed. For example,
in the legislative veto case, INS v. Chadha," the Supreme Court
employed the separation of powers principle directly, but took care to
discuss the basis of the principle-that the legislative veto sidesteps
important constitutional checks on legislative power, such as the
President's veto. 9
Another possible explanation is substantive. Many arguments
employing the broader definition of structuralism have focused, at least
in part, on its use in protecting individual rights.' This could betray a
concern that a focus on the relationships between structures overlooks
the Constitution's provisions dealing with individual rights.2 If so, the
concern is unfounded. Just as the Constitution recognizes the state
governments and establishes their relationship with the federal
government, it also recognizes "the people," and establishes their
relationship to government.22
The Constitution's focus on the relationship between the
government and the people begins with the first sentence-"We the
People... do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United
17. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 957-58.
20. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 13, at 1301-03 (arguing that the enumerated powers
should be construed in light of the "basic constitutional commitment to equality"); Reynolds,
supra note 13, at 1334-47 (comparing use of "penumbral reasoning" in individual rights cases
to its use in sovereign immunity and standing doctrines).
21. See BOBBITr, supra note 5, at 85 ("The second principal objection to structural
approaches is that they can offer no firm basis for personal rights.").
22. Cf TRIBE, supra note 16, at 46. For example, Professor Tribe has argued:
At an even simpler level, rights-securing provisions simply are about organizational
and institutional features of the constitutional scheme ... if only because
individuals.., are decision-making units within our system for allocating decisional
competence and sharing power, no less than are local governments, individual states,
and the nation as a whole.
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States of America"-and continues in countless other provisions
setting out the contours of the relationship. Although one commentator
has argued that inferences derived from the relationship of "citizens" to
government must be limited to the functioning of representative
government,24  this construction is unnecessarily narrow. The
Constitution sets out the relationship through two distinct types of
provisions; some relate to our control of government by establishing
elections for office25 and ensuring the right to vote,26 and others, such as
the Bill of Rights, set limits on the power of the government to constrain
our liberty.27 Focusing on the first type ignores half of the relationship
established by the Constitution. 8  Thus, defined in either way
structuralism is a comprehensive interpretive tool that can be applied to
individual rights questions.
Whether speaking in terms of the relationships between
constitutional structures or the structure of the document itself, the
broad principles underlying the Constitution drive the analysis. Because
the two definitions of structural interpretation describe the same
interpretive methodology in different ways, there is no reason to choose
one over the other. This Article, then, will make use of both definitions
throughout, referring to one or the other where appropriate to
illuminate the discussion.
II. STRUCTURAL INTERPRETATION IN SUPREME COURT
JURISPRUDENCE
Although one of Professor Black's main themes in Structure and
Relationship in Constitutional Law was his perception that structural
interpretation was under-utilized by the Warren Court, the
23. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
24. BOBBITr, supra note 5, at 89-90.
25. E.g., U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 ("The House of Representatives shall be composed
of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States ....").
26. E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.").
27. Of course certain constitutional provisions, such as the First Amendment's free
speech clause, are properly characterized as operating in both areas.
28. Part of the impetus for constraining the relationship to political rights may be the
choice of the word "citizen," which itself implies a political relationship. The Constitution
more often refers to the rights of "the people," e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. II, IV, IX, X, or
simply forbids Congress from legislating in certain areas, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I. The
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is a notable exception,
however.
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methodology is not new to constitutional jurisprudence.29 In fact, the
Court has been using structural arguments in a variety of areas for over
two hundred years. For example, commentators have noted the
Supreme Court's use of structural analysis in several doctrinal areas,
from federal sovereign immunity and plenary power over aliens" to
standing3 and the dormant Commerce Clause. 2 Examining a few of the
prominent cases and doctrinal areas in which structuralism has played
an important role will help to further illustrate what structuralism is,
how it is used (and misused), and why it is a legitimate method of
interpretation.
A. The Structural Basis at the Foundation of American Constitutional
Law-Key Examples of Structural Reasoning from Both Perspectives
Few cases can claim to have had more of an impact on the
development of American constitutional law than Chief Justice John
Marshall's opinions in Marbury v. Madison 3 and McCulloch v.
Maryland.4 Marbury established the principle of judicial review, 35 and
as a consequence serves as the foundation for any legal challenge to the
constitutionality of a federal law.36 McCulloch set the baseline for
discerning what is within the power of the federal government, and for
policing the boundaries between the federal government and the states.37
Each case, therefore, serves as a base on which countless other
precedents and doctrines rest; and each is itself largely grounded in
structural reasoning.
Marshall's use of structural reasoning in Marbury is a helpful
illustration of structural analysis from both Professor Black's relational
29. See John Harrison, Review of Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law, 89
VA. L. REV. 1779, 1781 (2003) ("It seems to me that Professor Black was right about the
importance of structurally derived limitations, but wrong about their under-use.").
30. See Young, supra note 14, at 1633.
31. See Reynolds, supra note 13, at 1337-40.
32. See Brannon P. Denning & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Comfortably Penumbral, 77
B.U. L. REV. 1089, 1093-96 (1997).
33. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
34. 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
35. In Marbury, Marshall held that the Judiciary Act of 1789, insofar as it purported to
expand the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, was unconstitutional. Of course, to
reach that holding, he first had to establish the broader proposition that the Supreme Court
has the power to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 174-75.
36. Id. at 175-80. In fact, without Marbury and judicial review, many of the new
federalism cases could not exist. Lopez and Morrison, New York and Printz, and Seminole
Tribe and Alden all declare federals laws or parts of federal laws unconstitutional.
37. 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 404-35.
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perspective and the broader themes and principles perspective. To
establish that the Constitution provides for judicial review, Marshall
relied in sequence on two distinct structural themes,38 beginning with the
supremacy of the Constitution and its superiority to other law. To build
support for this principle, Marshall begins with a prototypical example
of Professor Black's relational structuralism:
That the people have an original right to establish, for their
future government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most
conduce to their own happiness, is the basis, on which the whole
American fabric has been erected.... The principles, therefore,
so established, are deemed fundamental. And as the authority,
from which they proceed, is supreme, and can seldom act, they
are designed to be permanent.
39
The supremacy of the Constitution, according to Marshall, is
established by the relationship between citizens and government. The
people are sovereign and express their "supreme will" through the
written Constitution.' Because the government is a creation of the
people, it cannot violate their will by enacting laws contrary to the
Constitution.4 Marshall then supports his constitutional supremacy
premise further by showing that it is a theme expressed in the text of the
Constitution, both by the language of the Supremacy Clause,42 which
mentions the Constitution first "in declaring what shall be the supreme
law of the land, 43 and in its nature as a written document.'
To move the theoretical concept of constitutional supremacy into
38. See Amar, supra note 13, at 32. Professor Akil Amar has described Marbury's
strucutural arguments as follows:
Marbury's argument for judicial review is from start to finish an argument about the
Constitution's structure, history, and text. The argument rests on two basic
propositions. First, the written document is supreme law, enacted by the sovereign
American People and thus superior to statutes enacted by ordinary legislatures.
Second, judges should follow this supreme law even if it conflicts with a
congressional statute.
Id.
39. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 177.
42. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof.., shall be the supreme Law of the Land .. .
43. 5 U.S. (Cranch) at 180.
44. Id. at 177-78.
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practice through judicial review, Marshall turns to a second structural
principle-the role of the judiciary. Once again, his analysis begins by
examining the relationship between constitutional structures, here
examining the role of the judiciary in relation to the other branches of
government: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to
particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If
two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the
operation of each." 5 Marshall then makes the same point by pulling
themes from the text of the document, pointing to various clauses in the
Constitution that imply a role for the Court in examining the
constitutionality of congressional action.46 Some are direct, such as
Article III's extension of the "judicial Power" to "all Cases ... arising
under this Constitution,, 47 and others more subtle, such as the
prohibition on bills of attainder and ex-post-facto laws:48  "The
constitution declares that 'no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall
be passed.' If, however, such a bill should be passed and a person
should be prosecuted under it, must the court condemn to death those
victims whom the constitution endeavours to preserve?,
49
Marshall then combined premise one, the supremacy of the
Constitution, with premise two, that the judicial branch is charged with
applying the Constitution, and concluded that the Supreme Court could
declare laws that conflict with the Constitution void and refuse to
enforce them.50 Marbury, and its doctrine of judicial review, therefore,
rely heavily on structural reasoning,51 and serve as a good example of
structural analysis from both the relational and themes and principles
perspectives.
McCulloch v. Maryland also relies heavily on structural reasoning.
McCulloch held that Congress had the power to incorporate a national
bank, and that the state of Maryland was prohibited from taxing such a
45. Id. at 177.
46. Id. at 179.
47. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
49. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 179.
50. Id. at 180 ("[A] law repugnant to the constitution is void; and... courts, as well as
other departments, are bound by that instrument.").
51. Many scholars have discussed the structural reasoning in Marbury v. Madison. For
two good examples, see Amar, supra note 13, at 32, and Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C.
Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 887, 914-27 (2003).
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bank.52  Marshall's reasoning on both points is largely structural,53 a
method explicitly acknowledged and defended early in his analysis:
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the
subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all the
means by which they may be carried into execution, would
partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be
embraced by the human mind. It would, probably, never be
understood by the public. Its nature, therefore, requires, that
only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects
designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those
objects, be deduced from the nature of the objects
themselves.... [Wie must never forget, that it is a constitution
we are expounding.
Although, as with Marbury, it is possible to pull several examples of
both relational and themes and principles structuralism from
McCulloch,5 the case serves best as an example of one particular aspect
of thematic structural analysis-extra-textual effect. Often, when
undertaking structural analysis, the Court will look to certain provisions
of the Constitution as embodying independently enforceable principles
that reach beyond the mere text of the provision. Marshall employed
this strategy in part two of McCulloch, relying on extra-textual
implications of the Supremacy Clause to determine that the state of
Maryland did not have the power to tax a national bank incorporated by
Congress. 6
The Supremacy Clause states: "This Constitution, and the Laws of
the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be
52. 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 316, 426, 436 (1819).
53. On the structural reasoning in McCulloch see BLACK, supra note 4, at 14-15; see also
Young, supra note 14, at 1649-51; Denning & Reynolds, supra note 32, at 1093-96.
54. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 407.
55. For example, in arguing that Congress has the power to incorporate a bank where
that power is not explicitly granted by the Constitution, Marshall relies on relational
structuralism:
But it may with great reason be contended, that a government, intrusted with such
ample powers, on the due execution of which the happiness and prosperity of the
nation so vitally depends, must also be entrusted with ample means for their
execution. The power being given, it is the interest of the nation to facilitate its
execution.
Id. at 408.
56. 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 425-37.
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the supreme Law of the Land .... "" On its face, it says nothing about
the right of a state to tax an enterprise undertaken by the federal
government. Marshall, however, looked behind the mere language of
the Clause, and gave effect to the principle of federal supremacy which
it embodies:
There is no express provision for the case, but the claim has been
sustained on a principle which so entirely pervades the
constitution, is so intermixed with the materials which compose
it, so interwoven with its web, so blended with its texture, as to
be incapable of being separated from it, without rending it into
shreds. This great principle is, that the constitution and the laws
made in pursuance thereof are supreme; that they control the
constitution and laws of the respective States, and cannot be
controlled by them. 8
Having derived a broad principle of federal supremacy from the
relatively narrow language of the Supremacy Clause (and other
constitutional provisions), and having determined that the power to tax
a federal enterprise would give the state the power to control the federal
government, 9 Marshall concluded:
It is of the very essence of supremacy, to remove all obstacles to
its action within its own sphere, and so to modify every power
vested in subordinate governments, as to exempt its own
operations from their own influence. This effect need not be
stated in terms. It is so involved in the declaration of supremacy,
so necessarily implied in it, that the expression of it could not
make it more certain.'
Thus, in McCulloch, Marshall read the Supremacy Clause as having
a broader effect than the text of the provision alone would indicate-an
"extra-textual effect." This interpretive technique is common in
structural analysis, and, as will be examined in Part IV, has played an
important role in the new federalism jurisprudence.
B. Structural Reasoning in Separation of Powers Cases-Examining the
57. U.S. CONST. art. VI, c. 2.
58. 17 U.S. (Wheat.) at 426.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 427.
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Constitution as a Whole
Structural analysis is commonplace in the Supreme Court's
separation of powers jurisprudence.61 For example, in Bowsher v.
Synar,62 the Court carefully constructed a general principle of separation
of powers from various clauses in the Constitution:
Even a cursory examination of the Constitution reveals the
influence of Montesquieu's thesis that checks and balances were
the foundation of a structure of government that would protect
liberty. The Framers provided a vigorous Legislative Branch and
a separate and wholly independent Executive Branch, with each
branch responsible ultimately to the people.... Other, more
subtle, examples of separate powers are evident as well. Unlike
parliamentary systems ... no person who is an officer of the
United States may serve as a Member of the Congress....
Moreover, unlike parliamentary systems, the President, under
Article II, is responsible not to the Congress but to the people,
subject only to impeachment proceedings ....63
Having derived the principle, the Court then applied it to the case at
hand, determining that Congress could not assign certain budget
functions that were deemed "executive" to the Comptroller General (an
employee subject to removal only by Congress), stating: "A direct
congressional role in the removal of officers charged with the execution
of the laws ... is inconsistent with separation of powers.
61
Structural arguments can be found in several other separation of
powers cases as well.65 Though it will not be helpful to recount every
61. See H. Jefferson Powell, The President's Authority over Foreign Affairs: An
Executive Branch Perspective, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 527, 535 n.38 (1999) (noting that
"[m]uch of the Supreme Court's modern separation of powers jurisprudence explicitly rests
on structural inference"); Robert A. Schapiro, Contingency and Universalism in State
Separation of Powers Discourse, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 79, 90 (1998) ("[S]eparation
of powers principles often derive from structural inferences, rather than particular textual
commands.").
62. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
63. Id. at 722 (internal citations omitted).
64. Id. at 723.
65. For example, in Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the
Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., the Court relied on "basic separation-of-powers principles"
to invalidate an attempt to condition transfer of control over Washington area airports to a
local authority on the creation of a review board composed of congressmen with veto power.
501 U.S. 252, 277 n.23 (1991). Structural reasoning also played a prominent role in Justice
Scalia's dissent from the Court's decision upholding the independent counsel law in Morrison
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such instance here, focusing on one such case, Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer,66 illustrates not just another example of structural
reasoning in constitutional law, but an important example of why it is
important to read the Constitution holistically when deriving structural
themes; a lesson, as we will see, that has too often been overlooked in
the Supreme Court's federalism cases.
The facts in Youngstown are well known. A labor dispute between
most of the nation's steel mills and the United Steel Workers of
America, C.I.O., culminated in a threatened nationwide strike in April
1952, while the nation was involved in the Korean War. 7 A few hours
before the strike was set to begin, arguing that even a temporary
disruption of steel production would endanger the country in a time of
war, President Truman issued an executive order directing "the
Secretary of Commerce to take possession of most of the steel mills and
keep them running."'
The mill owners filed suit, challenging the President's order as
exceeding his authority under the Constitution,6 9 and the case quickly
found its way to the Supreme Court. To support the President's action,
the government urged a primarily structural argument, insisting that the
power to seize the mills could be inferred from the powers specifically
granted to the President by the Constitution:
The contention is that presidential power should be implied from
the aggregate of his powers under the Constitution. Particular
reliance is placed on provisions in Article II which say that "The
executive Power shall be vested in a President. . ."; that "he shall
take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed"; and that he
"shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States., 70
Read together, but in isolation from the rest of the Constitution, one
could reasonably derive a theme of expansive presidential authority
v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 704 (1988) ("Our opinions are full of the recognition that it is the
principle of separation of powers, and the inseparable corollary that each department's
'defense must.., be made commensurate to the danger of attack,' which gives
comprehensible content to the Appointments Clause, and determines the appropriate scope
of the removal power.") (internal citations omitted).
66. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
67. See id. at 582-83.
68. Id. at 583-84.
69. See id. at 583.
70. Id. at 587.
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from these provisions. The Court, however, declined to do so, and
instead developed a broader theme of separated powers by balancing
the Article II theme of presidential power against the powers of
Congress set out in Article L7 Viewing the question in light of the
Constitution as a whole, the Court properly held that the seizure had
exceeded the President's authority.72
Few would disagree with the Court's belief in Youngstown that the
proper theme to be derived from the Constitution is not expansive
presidential authority, but a government of separated and limited
powers.73 Youngstown therefore shows that structural reasoning must
begin with an examination of the Constitution as a whole, not merely
one particular part. Focusing on any one provision, to the exclusion of
others, can lead to the extraction of a principle that cannot fairly be
derived from the document as a whole. Though the Court successfully
avoided this tunnel-vision pitfall in Youngstown, it has not always been
able to do so when adopting structural arguments.
C. Structural Reasoning in Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence-
Answering the Charge of Indeterminacy
Structural reasoning has also played a prominent role in the Court's
fundamental rights cases, serving as the basis from which to derive
unenumerated rights. The archetypal example of structural reasoning in
an individual rights case is Justice Douglas' opinion for the Court in
Griswold v. Connecticut.74 The decision in Griswold is well known; the
Court held that a state law criminalizing the use of contraceptives (and
consultation about the use of contraceptives by a doctor through an
aiding and abetting statute) was unconstitutional because it violated the
right to privacy." Of course, there is no "right to privacy" provision in
the Bill of Rights or elsewhere in the Constitution, but, as Justice
Douglas rightly pointed out, that cannot end the analysis-"[t]he Ninth
Amendment provides: 'The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people."'
76
71. See id. at 587-88.
72. See id. at 588.
73. Id. at 583-87.
74. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
75. Id. at 485.
76. Id. at 484 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IX). Although Justice Douglas does rely on
the Ninth Amendment, Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Griswold significantly
expands upon its interpretation and application to the case. Id. at 486-499.
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The source of the right to privacy on which Justice Douglas relied,
however, was not simply the Ninth Amendment's admonition that there
are unenumerated rights. Instead, he derived the right to privacy as a
principle evidenced in other provisions of the Constitution securing
individual rights:
The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of
Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those
guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various
guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association
contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we
have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the
quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time of peace without
the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The
Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the "right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures." The Fifth Amendment in
its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone
of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to
his detriment.77
Justice Douglas then applied the privacy principle underlying or
motivating various provisions of the Bill of Rights directly to the case at
hand, and determined that the Connecticut law at issue was
unconstitutional because it violated that principle."8  Griswold,
therefore, is a quintessential example of structural analysis.79
Although the structural methodology employed by Justice Douglas
was by no means new or unique, his opinion has been the subject of
significant criticism. Much of the criticism is unsurprising, having been
leveled by conservative commentators championing originalism in
77. Id. at 484 (internal citations omitted).
78. Id. at 485-86.
79. The structural nature of the Griswold opinion, and its relationship to structural
reasoning in other cases, has been noted previously by several commentators, see, e.g., Tribe
supra note 12, at 139-40 (discussing the similarity in methodology between Griswold and
various federalism cases); Reynolds, supra note, 13 at 1334-36 (describing the decision in
Griswold and comparing the methodology to other doctrines), and, as pointed out by
Professor Tribe, occasionally by Justices of the Supreme Court, Tribe, supra note 12, at 139-
40, citing Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
665 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The full reach of that case's dramatic expansion of the
judge-made doctrine of sovereign immunity is unpredictable; its dimensions are defined only
by the present majority's perception of constitutional penumbras rather than constitutional
text.").
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constitutional interpretation. 8° But unease with the opinion in Griswold
is not confined to originalist conservatives, and doubts about its
reasoning have been raised even by commentators who seek to further
support the result. 1 In fact, Griswold's more famous progeny, Roe v.
Wade," appears to express doubt with Griswold's basis for the right to
privacy," and subtly de-emphasizes the penumbra rationale and shifts
the focus to "the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty
and restrictions upon state action."4
One might wonder, then, if structuralism is such a common and
accepted method of constitutional interpretation, why there has been so
much resistance to the structural rationale in Griswold. The answer, I
believe, is that the application of structural analysis in Griswold is not
particularly convincing. Like any method of analysis, structuralism can
be done well and it can be done poorly,85 and when done poorly it is not
likely to be persuasive.
The problem with Justice Douglas' structural analysis is not that he
derived a principle that is not there. 6 There undoubtedly is a privacy
theme cutting across several provisions of the Bill of Rights; as Justice
Douglas notes, the Third Amendment's prohibition against quarteringe
and the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures' reflect a principle favoring protection from "governmental
80. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW 99-100, 143 (1991) (criticizing the opinion in Griswold and later arguing that
originalism is the only legitimate method of interpretation).
81. See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 328 (1992) (expressing doubt that a
convincing rationale exists to support the decision in Griswold but noting that "[a]
constitution that did not invalidate so offensive, oppressive, probably undemocratic, and
sectarian a law would stand revealed as containing major gaps"); Amar, supra note 13, at 75-
76 (stating that the Court's reliance on the Fifth Amendment was "outlandish" and arguing
than an equality rationale would have been more convincing); Harry H. Wellington, Common
Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J.
221, 292-94 (1973) (agreeing that the statute in Griswold was unconstitutional, but stating
that "[p]enumbras were not necessary, zones of privacy, an unfortunate invention, and
reliance on the Fourth Amendment, a mistake").
82. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
83. Id. at 152-55 (citing Griswold as one of several precedential bases for the right to
privacy, and later stating "most of these courts have agreed that the right of privacy, however
based, is broad enough to cover the abortion decision") (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 153.
85. See Young, supra note 14, at 1604 ("[T]he jurisprudence of 'big-ideas'-ike any
other interpretive methodology--can be done well or poorly.").
86. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,484 (1965).
87. See U.S. CONST. amend. III.
88. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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invasions 'of the sanctity of a man's home."'89 The problem is that this
type of privacy, on its face, has little to do with a person's private choice
to use, or not to use, contraception.' Although Justice Douglas
attempts to tie the concepts together by asking rhetorically whether we
would "allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital
bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives, '" 91 there simply is
no direct fit. Thus, the problem with Griswold's structural analysis is
that the constitutional principle, though properly derived, is not directly
relevant to the issue at hand.
This does not mean, however, that Griswold was wrongly decided, or
that structural interpretation was inappropriate. There are principles
that can be fairly derived from the Constitution to justify the decision in
Griswold; Justice Douglas merely focused on the wrong theme, or more
specifically, too narrow a theme. Later right to privacy cases have
shifted their focus to correct this problem. In Roe for example, the
Court cited Griswold as authority for the existence of the right to
privacy, 92 but in stating its own rationale eschewed notions of privacy in
the Third and Fourth Amendments and instead turned to "the
Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty." 93  The Court
continued to move toward a liberty rationale in its reaffirmation of Roe
in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,94 and
most recently in striking down a law criminalizing homosexual sodomy
in Lawrence v. Texas.95 In their joint opinion for the Court in Casey,
89. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630
(1886)).
90. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 745 n.47 (1989)
(noting that Griswold's invocation of privacy does not make clear whether it means privacy in
the traditional sense, "an interest in keeping certain matters out of public view," or its more
substantive sense "an interest in making one's own decisions about certain 'private' matters").
91. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
92. 410 U.S. at 152.
93. Id. at 153.
94. 505 U.S. 833, 846-53 (1992).
95. 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003). Justice Kennedy's move toward a liberty rationale in
Lawrence is explicit:
It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon this
relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain
their dignity as free persons. When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate
conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond
that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual
persons the right to make this choice.
Id. (emphasis added).
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Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter significantly de-emphasized
the privacy rationale, reconceptualizing it as an aspect of the broader
"liberty" interest 96 protected by the Constitution: "These matters,
involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in
a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central
to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. "'
Although neither Casey nor Lawrence attempts to build the same
type of broad structural basis that Justice Douglas sought in Griswold,
relying instead primarily on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment as the source of the liberty right,98 structural reasoning
continues to play an important role. On its face, the Due Process Clause
is not a ground for striking down state statutes; it only ensures that
"liberty" not be deprived without "due process of law."'  The Clause
therefore can only impact the statutes at issue in Casey and Lawrence if
it is given extra-textual effect and applied for the principle it
represents-liberty or freedom from arbitrary governmental action-
rather than its textual command.1°°
96. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 ("Constitutional protection of the woman's decision to
terminate her pregnancy derives from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. It declares that no State shall 'deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.' The controlling word in the cases before us is 'liberty."').
97. Id. at 851 (emphasis added); see also Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy's
Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, 2002-2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 21, 33-37 (2003)
(describing the switch from privacy to liberty in Casey and Lawrence).
98. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846-47, 851; Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573-74. Part of this
difference can be attributed to the historical context of the Griswold decision. Douglas had
been appointed to the Court by Franklin Roosevelt "for the avowed purpose of changing the
course of decision on the Court, particularly its hostility toward New Deal economic
legislation." Helen Garfield, Privacy, Abortion, and Judicial Review: Haunted by the Ghost of
Lochner, 61 WASH. L. REV. 293, 304 (1986). He had written an opinion proclaiming the end
of Lochner, and obviously sought to avoid its stigma by locating the right to privacy in the
penumbras of the Bill of Rights as opposed to the Due Process Clause. See id. at 305.
99. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
100. There are other structural aspects to the cases as well. In Casey, for example, the
joint opinion, in an attempt to further define the contours of the liberty right, relies on a
structural argument first advanced by the second Justice Harlan:
[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be
found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere
provided in the Constitution. This 'liberty' is not a series of isolated points pricked
out in terms of the taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the
right to keep and bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures;
and so on. It is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom
from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints .... and which
also recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain
interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify
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Furthermore, there is a much broader constitutional base from
which to derive the liberty principle. The Constitution specifically
mentions liberty not only in the Fourteenth Amendment,0 ' but also in
the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause"° and the Preamble,"
which states that securing "the Blessings of Liberty" is one of the
primary goals underlying the whole document. The Constitution's
rights-securing provisions"' are further evidence of the liberty theme,
and the Ninth Amendment serves as a reminder that the liberty
principle is broader than the rights specifically enumerated.' Although
the Third and Fourth Amendments do lend support to a broad liberty
principle, more apt analogies for the type of liberty at issue in Griswold
are the freedom of thought implicit in the First Amendment's guarantee
of free speech"° (on which Justice Douglas did, in part, rely°7), and the
liberty of conscience guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause,"
involving as they do "intimate and personal choices... central to
personal dignity and autonomy."' '°  Thus, there was a convincing
principle to be derived from the Constitution to support the result in
Griswold, but by focusing too narrowly on the idea of "privacy," Justice
Douglas' opinion missed the mark."°
Some have argued that this type of reasoning reveals that
indeterminacy is an inherent flaw in structural analysis-since the
principles that can be derived from the Constitution are often as
abstract as "liberty," they do not themselves distinguish between those
their abridgment.
505 U.S. at 848-49 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(alterations in original)).
101. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
102. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
103. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
104. Primarily located in the Bill of Rights, U.S. CONST. amends., I-VIII, and U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9.
105. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
106. U.S. CONST. amend. I. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) ("Liberty
presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and
certain intimate conduct."); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977) ("[A]t
the heart of the First Amendment is the notion that an individual should be free to believe as
he will, and that in a free society one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his
conscience rather than coerced by the State.").
107. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
108. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
109. See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
110. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-86.
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cases in which they should control and those in which they should not."'
Professor Black's response to the indeterminacy charge was an
unabashed, though more eloquent, admonition that those who live in
glass houses should not throw stones. Because his foil was textualism,
he focused his argument there, noting that "[t]he precision of textual
explication is nothing but specious in the areas that matter.',1 2  He
continued:
The question is not whether the text shall be respected, but
rather how one goes about respecting a text of that high
generality and consequent ambiguity which marks so many
crucial constitutional texts. I submit that the generalities and
ambiguities are not greater when one applies the method of
reasoning from structure and relation.
3
Professors Laurence Tribe and Michael Dorf have noted that the same
problem can also infect doctrinal and historical interpretations, as the
level of generality from which one chooses to view a precedent or
tradition will determine whether it can be applied by analogy to future
cases."4 On a certain level, this is a valid response-if some amount of
indeterminacy disqualifies a method of interpretation, there may be no
acceptable means through which to give substance to the often-vague
terms of the Constitution. Textual phrases such as "due process,"
''equal protection,' ''regulate Commerce ... among the several States,"
and "the freedom of speech," after all, are hardly self-defining, to say
nothing of truly indeterminate provisions such as the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments.
Another defense is available, however, and one that commends the
virtues of structural analysis as opposed to simply casting aspersions on
other methods of interpretation. Because it involves the application of
principles derived from the text of the Constitution, structuralism
111. See Young, supra note 14, at 1636-37 ("[Professor] Black's ability time and again to
justify morally appealing results on structural grounds might, after a while, give rise to the
suspicion that a sufficiently skillful structuralist can justify any result he pleases."); BOBBITT,
supra note 5, at 84-85 ("Structural arguments are sometimes accused of being indeterminate
because while we can all agree on the presence of the various structures, we fall to bickering
when called upon to decide whether a particular result is necessarily inferred from their
relationships.").
112. See BLACK, supra note 4, at 29.
113. Id. at 30-31.
114. Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of
Rights, 57 U. CHi. L. REV. 1057, 1062-63, 1065-67 (1990).
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contains within itself a means of limitation."' Only themes and
principles that can be fairly derived from the text are available to the
conscientious structuralist. For example, liberty may seem like a very
broad principle at first glance, but upon closer inspection it is clear that
the Constitution does not, indeed cannot, be read to support a broad
right of freedom from any and all government intrusions. After all, the
Constitution affirmatively grants the federal government power in
certain areas1 16 and assumes that the state governments retain significant
authority in others.1 17  The key is to look to the liberty securing
provisions of the Constitution to determine what the principle can be
said to protect. As Justice Harlan stated in dissent in Poe v. Ullman,'
8
"liberty" is not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of
the taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion;
the right to keep and bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures; and so on. It is a rational continuum...
which also recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive judgment
must, that certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of
the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment." 9
By analogizing to rights specifically secured by the text of the
Constitution, one can begin to distinguish between the types of cases
where the liberty principle will control, and those in which it will not.
For example, the Constitution's rights-securing provisions do not
evidence a significant concern for the type of "economic liberty" that
the Court notoriously protected in Lochner v. New York.'20 On the
other hand, as discussed above, cases like Griswold and Lawrence fall
115. See Reynolds, supra note 13, at 1346 ("Penumbral reasoning, precisely because it
ties the development of new principles to the overall structure and purposes of the
Constitution, probably is less likely to create truly unwarranted or unacceptable results than
many other approaches.").
116. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
117. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
118. 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 543. The majority of the Court has since invoked Justice Harlan's theory in
other fundamental rights cases. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 848 (1992); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,*502 (1977) (holding single family
home ordinance that prevented grandmother from living with son, grandson, and another
grandson that was a cousin of first, unconstitutional).
120. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). But see RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST
CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 253-69 (2004) (arguing that the
Constitution should be interpreted to include a broad presumption of liberty, including
economic liberty).
[88:693
STRUCTURAL INTERPRETATION
much closer to the core values protected by certain parts of the First
Amendment. Admittedly, these are still hard cases about which
reasonable minds may differ, but disagreement in difficult cases is not
new, and it is not unique to structural analysis.2
Though structural analysis must admit to a certain level of
indeterminacy, this cannot be fatal to its use as an interpretive tool.
Indeterminacy plagues other methods of interpretation as well, and
likely cannot be completely avoided in any process of judgment.
Moreover, because it is tied to the text of the Constitution, structural
analysis is also inherently self-limiting, confining its indeterminacy to the
margins. This inherent limit saves structuralism from the charge that it
grants interpreters boundless discretion, and is one of two key features
that legitimate its use as a tool of constitutional interpretation.
III. WHY STRUCTURALISM IS LEGITIMATE: BALANCING TWO
FUNDAMENTAL TENETS OF WRITTEN CONSTITUTIONALISM
Before turning to a critical analysis of the modern Supreme Court's
use of structural reasoning in federalism cases, one final question needs
to be asked about the methodology generally: why is it that structural
reasoning is so common, or, to ask the question in a more probing way,
what makes structural reasoning legitimate? For some, the Court's long
pattern of structural interpretation is itself sufficient to answer the
1221 tilegitimacy question. It is certainly true that throwing out structural
interpretation at this point would mean wiping the slate clean in any
number of areas, and there is, of course, value in preserving stability in
constitutional law.'23 This approach, however, attempts to answer the
question without ever really addressing it, and can only legitimize past
uses of structural interpretation, not its continued use.124
121. See BOBBITr, supra note 5, at 85 ("If we don't agree in the hard cases, that is
nothing new; and perhaps being forced to make the process explicit, we will sharpen our
senses and eventually achieve a greater coherence.").
122. See Christopher Chrisman, Note, Constitutional Structure and the Second
Amendment: A Defense of the Individual Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 439,
456-57 (2001).
123. See Amar, supra note 13, at 54 (discussing generally the benefits of textual (or
documentarian) analysis over doctrinal analysis, but admitting that "pragmatic
documentarians may at times be obliged to yield to deeply entrenched and widely accepted
practices"); Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 723, 744-46 (1988) (concluding that his preferred originalism must sometimes yield to
stare decisis). See also Casey, 505 U.S. at 854-69 (relying in part on stare decisis to reaffirm
the essential holding of Roe v. Wade).
124. Cf Monaghan, supra note 123, at 759 (noting that stare decisis may be a legitimate
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A better justification for structural reasoning is its unique ability to
balance two fundamental, but seemingly contradictory, tenets of
constitutionalism-that the Constitution must be flexible enough to
apply across time to unforeseen circumstances, and that we must adhere
to the text of the Constitution.'25 As with many of our basic premises in
constitutional law, each finds its roots in the opinions of former Chief
Justice John Marshall. The first is ably expressed in the following
passage from McCulloch v. Maryland:
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the
subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all the
means by which they may be carried into execution, would
partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be
embraced by the human mind. It would, probably, never be
understood by the public. Its nature, therefore, requires, that
only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects
designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those
objects, be deduced from the nature of the objects
themselves.... [W]e must never forget that it is a constitution we
are expounding.2 6
Put another way, a constitution cannot be written to answer every
constitutional question. Myriad commentators have addressed this
point. Professor Philip Bobbitt, for example, has described what he calls
a "constitutional sense," a feeling that a question has constitutional
implications even where there is no obviously controlling textual
provision.27 Seen through this lens, the Constitution's more open-ended
provisions, such as the Ninth Amendment,'12 begin to look like textual
invitations to engage in some form of nontextual analysis.9
Structural analysis fits well with this important aspect of
basis for preserving precedent, but not for extending it).
125. See Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and Comparative
Constitutional Experience, 51 DUKE L.J. 223, 239 (2001) (noting "enduring debates between
the idea that a written constitution is intended to be rigid and constraining, on the one hand,
and that a good constitution is intended to be flexible and empowering, on the other.").
126. 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
127. See BOBBITr, supra note 5, at 85. See also, e.g., POSNER, supra note 81, at 328
(noting that the Constitution contains gaps, and that the Court, perhaps, should attempt to fill
the most glaring ones).
128. See U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
129. See Young, supra note 14, at 1628 (noting that the Guarantee Clause may be a
"textual mandate for structural argument" (emphasis removed)).
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constitutionalism; themes and principles derived from the text can be
applied to questions that alert our constitutional sense. For Professor
Black, this was the primary virtue of structural analysis: "I think well of
[structure and relation], above all, because to succeed it has to make
sense-current, practical sense."'30  Others have trumpeted this benefit
as well.' For example, Brandon Denning and Professor Glenn Harlan
Reynolds have argued that a primary benefit of structural reasoning is
that it "can help clean up the 'inkblot' problem posed by puzzling
constitutional provisions, like the Ninth and Tenth Amendments" and
"to vindicate principles that 'everyone knows' informed the
Constitution, but are nowhere mentioned explicitly.' ' 2 The expansive
virtue of structuralism, however, is only half the story. After all, any
interpretive methodology that does not rely solely on explicit textual
commands can make the same claim. Historical arguments, for
example, can also be used to fill in perceived gaps in the Constitution's
text.'33
What is unique about structural arguments is that they adhere to a
second fundamental tenet of constitutionalism, this one rooted in Chief
Justice Marshall's other great opinion, Marbury v. Madison:
This original and supreme will organizes the government, and
assigns, to different departments, their respective powers. It may
either stop here; or establish certain limits not to be transcended
by those departments.
The government of the United States is of the latter
description. The powers of the legislature are defined, and
limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten,
the constitution is written. To what purpose are powers limited,
and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if
these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be
restrained?"M
By focusing on the importance of the Constitution as a written
130. BLACK, supra note 4, at 22.
131. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 13, at 1282-83 ("Like Black, I believe that attention to
basic structures of constitutional relationships is a powerful interpretive tool, not least
because of its appeal to a shared 'constitutional sense."') (citations omitted).
132. Denning & Reynolds, supra note 32, at 1119.
133. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gearld D., 491 U.S. 110, 122-23 (1989) (writing for a
plurality of the Court, Justice Scalia applied a "traditionally protected by our society" test to
determine whether unenumerated rights warranted constitutional protection).
134. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176 (emphasis added).
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document, Marshall makes the claim that adherence to the text is of
primary importance. Though not strictly "textual," structural arguments
are derived from the text, and therefore embody this aspect of
constitutionalism as well. It should not be surprising then, that
adherence to the text is also a virtue of structuralism trumpeted by
Professor Black and others."' The unique virtue of structuralism, and, I
would submit, the principle that legitimizes its use as a tool for
interpreting the Constitution, is its ability to bring these two seemingly
contradictory aspects of constitutionalism together.
136
It is worth pausing here to note a perhaps obvious consequence of
this argument-any theme or principle applied in a structural analysis
must be derived from the text of the Constitution itself. Extra-
constitutional principles derived from other sources are not related to
the text, and therefore cannot achieve the same balance between these
competing constitutional visions. To take one example, Professor
Ernest Young has noted a type of argument he calls "big ideas"
structuralism.' 37 Big ideas analysis is similar to the structuralism I have
described in that it involves the application of general principles to
resolve specific constitutional questions, but it "diverges from Professor
Black by emphasizing the historical understanding of the Constitution's
structure., 13 8 In other words, as opposed to building its principles from
the text of the Constitution, it superimposes principles derived from a
historical analysis. Because big ideas, or historical, structural analysis
applies principles from outside the Constitution's text, it cannot achieve
the same balance that justifies its text-based cousin. This is not to say
that the historical structural analysis noted by Professor Young is
illegitimate. History, like text and structure, certainly has a role to play
in balanced constitutional interpretation. "9  The point is that
135. See BLACK, supra note 4, at 31 ("There is, moreover, a close and perpetual
interworking between the textual and the relational and structural modes of reasoning, for
the structure and relations cohcerned are themselves created by the text, and inference drawn
from them must surely be controlled by the text."); see also, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 13 at
1346 ("Penumbral reasoning, precisely because it ties the development of new principles to
the overall structure and purposes of the Constitution, probably is less likely to create truly
unwarranted or unacceptable results than many other approaches.").
136. See Denning & Reynolds, supra note 32, at 1119 (noting that the "constant
reemergence" of structural interpretation, or in their nomenclature, "penumbral reasoning,"
suggests that it must play a "vital role" in its ability to "mediate between the need to root
constitutional decisions in the text of the Constitution, and the frank realization that the
Framers did not-and could not-provide answers to all of our interpretive questions.").
137. Young, supra note 14, at 1603.
138. Id. at 1639.
139. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of
[88:693
2005] STRUCTURAL INTERPRETATION
"structural" arguments not based on principles derived from the text
must find their legitimacy elsewhere"
IV. STRUCTURAL INTERPRETATION IN MODERN FEDERALISM
JURISPRUDENCE: THE COMPETING THEMES OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY
AND FEDERAL SUPREMACY
One of the dominant trends in the jurisprudence of the Rehnquist
Court over the last ten to fifteen years has been a reinvigoration of
constraints on national power, undertaken in the name of federalism.4
This body of law, termed both the "new federalism"'142 and the
"federalist revival,' 43 cuts across multiple cases and contexts, but at its
core involves three distinct doctrinal areas: the anticommandeering
rule,'" limitations on the exercise of Congress's enumerated powers
(especially under the Commerce Clause)' 4 ' and state sovereign
immunity.' 4 As many commentators have noted, the new federalism
Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1987) (asserting that many types of
arguments, including historical arguments, can and should be blended together into coherent
interpretations of the Constitution).
140. Professor Young provides a compelling argument for the legitimacy of historical
structural analysis by tying it to Professor Lawrence Lessig's innovative "translation" theory.
See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEx. L. REV. 1165, 1263 (1993) (summarizing
the model of fidelity in translation). In the words of Professor Young:
[T]he institutional environment created by the Constitution has changed
fundamentally over the course of our history, often without any corresponding
change in the constitutional text. "Translation" seeks to maintain fidelity to the
presuppositions of the original constitutional structure in the changed institutional
context. "Big ideas" structuralism is useful for these purposes because the "big
ideas" at the heart of the approach are typically integral to the presuppositions that
the interpreter is seeking to maintain.
Young, supra note 14, at 1654 (internal citations omitted).
141. See Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and
Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2181 (1998) ("The constitutional law of federalism-
based constraints on the federal government has risen phoenix-like from the ashes of post-
New Deal enthusiasm for the exercise of national power."); John C. Yoo, Sounds of
Sovereignty: Defining Federalism in the 1990s, 32 IND. L. REV. 27, 27 (1998).
142. See, e.g., Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Rehnquist Court and State Sovereignty:
Limitations of the New Federalism, 12 WIDENER L.J. 459, 460 (2003) (describing the "new
federalism" as encompassing four doctrinal areas: limits on the commerce power, the Tenth
Amendment, sovereign immunity, and limitations on Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
143. See Jackson, supra note 141, at 2181-82 (discussing "the Court's recent federalist
revival").
144. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
145. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
146. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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cases often rely heavily on structural reasoning. ' This fact alone should
not be surprising; the Court commonly employs structural reasoning in a
variety of areas, and federalism cases are no exception. In 1934, for
example, the Court explicitly relied on "postulates which limit and
control" found "[b]ehind the words of" Article Three and the Eleventh
Amendment, to hold that states are immune from suit in federal court
by foreign governments absent their consent. 148  McCulloch v.
Maryland,49 of course, is another prominent example.
What is interesting about the use of structural reasoning in the new
federalism cases is that it is often employed by both the majority and the
dissent to reach very different conclusions. In a recurring argument
reminiscent of early Federalist/Republican debates between Alexander
Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson, " the majority has relied on a state
sovereignty principle to reach pro-state outcomes, and the dissenters
turn to a federal supremacy theme and come out the other way. This
conflict begs an obvious and important question-which side has the
better structural argument? Before turning to that question, however, it
is necessary to take a closer look at the competing sides.
A. New Federalism's Prequel: The State Sovereignty/Federal Supremacy
Debate in Regulatory Immunity Cases
The sovereignty/supremacy debate first played out (in the modern
Court) in a well-known trio of cases in which the Supreme Court twice
reversed itself over the issue of Congress's power to directly regulate
states pursuant to the Commerce Clause. In the first case, Maryland v.
Wirtz,'5' the Court held that Congress could apply the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA") to the states.'52 Although the majority hinted
at a federal supremacy theme underlying its decision,'53 the opinion was
147. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 13, at 1274 (describing the Court's approach in
"defining immunities of the states" as "structural and holistic"); Tribe, supra note 12, at 138
(describing the use of "structural inference" in new federalism cases).
148. See Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934).
149. 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 316, 316 (1819).
150. See J. M. Balkin, Review Essay, Constitutional Interpretation and the Problem of
History, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 923-24 (1988) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM:
THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987)) (discussing early debates about the "relative powers of the
states and the federal government").
151. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
152. The provisions of the FLSA that were challenged in Wirtz applied general
minimum wage and overtime rules to a particular subset of state employees, specifically
certain employees of hospitals, institutions, and schools. Id. at 186-87.
153. Id. at 195-96 ("[I]t is clear that the Federal Government, when acting within a
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mostly pragmatic and textual in tone, and was not explicitly structural.
The dissent, however, relied heavily on a particular structural argument
that would become a mainstay of the majority opinions in the new
federalism cases.154 Justice Douglas, writing for himself and Justice
Stewart, derived a general principle of state sovereignty from the Tenth
Amendment:
But what is done here is nonetheless such a serious invasion of
state sovereignty protected by the Tenth Amendment that it is in
my view not consistent with our constitutional federalism.
If all this can be done, then the National Government could
devour the essentials of state sovereignty, though that
sovereignty is attested by the Tenth Amendment.56
Of course, the text of the Tenth Amendment contains no general rule
against congressional regulation of states, and nowhere mentions thephrase "state sovereignty.,117 Because Justice Douglas cast the
argument in structural terms, however, the specific textual rule was
secondary. Instead, similar to Chief Justice Marshall's extra-textual
invocation of the Supremacy Clause in McCulloch," he interpreted the
Tenth Amendment as embodying a broad principle of state sovereignty.
Douglas then applied the state sovereignty principle directly, and
determined that it prohibited Congress from imposing the FLSA's
employment rules on states.
Eight years after the decision in Wirtz, the Court revisited the
question of Congress's power to apply the FLSA to the states in
National League of Cities v. Usery.' 9 In an opinion relying heavily on
delegated power, may override countervailing state interests whether these be described as
'governmental' or 'proprietary' in character"; "federal power over commerce is 'superior to
that of the States to provide for the welfare or necessities of their inhabitants."') (citations
omitted).
154. Id. at 201-05 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 201.
156. Id. at 205.
157. See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.").
158. See the discussion of McCulloch and extra-textual effect, supra notes 52-60 and
accompanying text.
159. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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the extra-textual effect of the Tenth Amendment, 6" then-Justice
Rehnquist adopted Justice Douglas' state sovereignty theory.'61
Expressly overruling Wirtz, 62 the Court held that Congress could not
apply the FLSA's employment rules against states in "areas of
traditional governmental functions."'63 Justice Brennan dissented from
the Court's decision, relying in large part on his own structural
argument-that the principle of federal supremacy embedded within the
Constitution precludes state regulatory immunity.' 6' To establish this
countervailing principle, Justice Brennan relied on former Chief Justice
Marshall's extra-textual invocation of the Supremacy Clause in
McCulloch, quoting:
If any one proposition could command the universal assent of
mankind, we might expect it would be this-that the government
of the Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme within its
sphere of action. This would seem to result necessarily from its
nature. It is the government of all.., and acts for all.... The
government of the United States, then, though limited in its
powers, is supreme; and its laws, when made in pursuance of the
constitution, form the supreme law of the land, "any thing in the
constitution or laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding."' 65
Quoting another source, Justice Brennan continued: "'[It] is not a
controversy between equals' when the Federal Government 'is asserting
its sovereign power to regulate commerce.... [T]he interests of the
nation are more important than those of any state."" 6  Because he
160. See, e.g., id. at 842. Regarding the Tenth Amendment, Justice Rehnquist stated:
While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a "truism," stating merely
that "all is retained which has not been surrendered," it is not without significance.
The Amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may not
exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to
function effectively in a federal system.
Id. (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975) (citations omitted)).
161. Id. at 852.
162. See id. at 855.
163. See id. at 852.
164. Id. at 859 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
165. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
316, 405-06 (1819)) (internal citations omitted).
166. Id. (quoting Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 425-26 (1925)). Justice
Brennan also relied on Alexander Hamilton's Federalist No. 31, which stated:
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relied on the federal supremacy theme as controlling, Justice Brennan
concluded that Congress could apply the FLSA to the states:
"[W]hile the commerce power has limits, valid general
regulations of commerce do not cease to be regulations of
commerce because a State is involved. If a State is engaging in
economic activities that are validly regulated by the Federal
Government when engaged in by private persons, the State too
may be forced to conform its activities to federal regulation.',
167
Justice Brennan's opinion foreshadowed the later new federalism
cases in two important ways. First, his federal supremacy principle
forms the basis of structural arguments often raised in dissenting
opinions in the new federalism cases. Second, though he was willing to
give extra-textual effect to the Supremacy Clause to derive a broad
federal supremacy theme, he was unwilling to credit the possibility that
a similar interpretation of the Tenth Amendment was possible. Instead,
he took the majority to task for applying that provision beyond its clear
textual mandate, which merely says that states retain those powers not
granted to the federal government by the Constitution.'8 This striking
contrast to the Court's holistic structural approach in cases like
Youngstown 69 is a recurring feature of the new federalism.
In 1985, nine years after National League of Cities, and just
seventeen years after it had first addressed the issue in Wirtz, the Court
once again reversed itself as to whether the FLSA could be applied to
the states in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.7 °
Although Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court is best known for its
reliance on the political protections of states built into the organization
of the federal government, 17' he also relied on the federal supremacy
A government ought to contain in itself every power requisite to the full
accomplishment of the objects committed to its care, and to the complete execution
of the trusts for which it is responsible; free from every other control, but a regard to
the public good and to the sense of the people.
Id. at 857 n.1 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 31 (Alexander Hamilton)).
167. Id. at 861 (quoting Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 196-97).
168. Id. at 861-62.
169. 343 U.S. at 587-88. See generally supra notes 56-73 and accompanying text.
170. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
171. For example, two Senators from each state, and the Electoral College. See id. at
550-57. Essentially, Justice Blackmun argued that the sovereignty of the states was
adequately protected by their representation in the national political process. He noted for
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principle that Justice Brennan had championed in his National League
of Cities dissent. In fact, Justice Blackmun began his analysis by noting
that the "sovereignty of the States is limited by the Constitution
itself,"'72 and concluded that although the states retain "a significant
measure of sovereign authority'..., [t]hey do so... only to the extent
that the Constitution has not divested them of their original powers and
transferred those powers to the Federal Government., 17 He continued:
In the words of James Madison to the Members of the First
Congress: "Interference with the power of the States was no
constitutional criterion of the power of Congress. If the power
was not given, Congress could not exercise it; if given, they might
exercise it, although it should interfere with the laws, or even the
Constitution of the States."'74
In two separate dissenting opinions, both Justice Rehnquist 75 and
Justice O'Connor 176 predicted that Garcia, and its federal supremacy
example, that the states "were given.., influence in the Senate, where each State received
equal representation," id. at 551, and also relied on other indirect influences on the legislative
and executive branches, such as their "control of electoral qualifications and their role in
Presidential elections." Id. Due to these limitations, he concluded that independent rules
based on the principle of state sovereignty were both unnecessary and unwarranted.
Interestingly, Justice Blackmun had joined the majority opinion in National League of Cities,
though he limited his concurrence in a separate opinion. See Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U.S. 833, 856 (1976) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
172. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 548. Justice Blackmun wrote:
[T]he sovereignty of the States is limited by the Constitution itself. A variety of
sovereign powers, for example, are withdrawn from the States by Article I, § 10.
Section 8 of the same Article works an equally sharp contraction of state sovereignty
by authorizing Congress to exercise a wide range of legislative powers and (in
conjunction with the Supremacy Clause of Article VI) to displace contrary state
legislation.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
173. Id. at 549 (quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 269 (1983) (Powell, J.,
dissenting)).
174. Id. (internal citations omitted).
175. See id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist wrote:
But under any one of these approaches the judgment in these cases should be
affirmed, and I do not think it incumbent on those of us in dissent to spell out
further the fine points of a principle that will, I am confident, in time again
command the support of a majority of this Court.
Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
176. See id. at 589 ("I would not shirk the duty acknowledged by National League of
Cities and its progeny, and I share Justice Rehnquist's belief that this Court will in time again
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theme, would eventually be pushed aside by the principle of state
sovereignty.'" Garcia itself has not been overturned,'78  but these
assertions have nonetheless proved prescient. Although the federal
government has the power to impose at least some regulation on the
states, the new federalism cases have minimized this ability in a variety
of ways-all in the name of state sovereignty.
B. Sovereignty and Supremacy in the Anticommandeering Cases
The cornerstone of the new federalism jurisprudence was laid in
New York v. United States 79 in 1992. The 1985 amendments to the Low-
Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act"8 included provisions intended to
encourage states to develop strategies for effective disposal of low-level
radioactive waste. One of these, known as the "take title provision,"
required states either to "regulat[e] pursuant to Congress'[s] direction"
or to "tak[e] title to and possession of the low level radioactive waste
generated within their borders."1 2 The Court held that this provision
was unconstitutional because it "commandeered" state legislatures by
forcing the state to act in accordance with a congressional mandate.'
3
Although Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court relied mainly on
precedent for its "anticommandeering" rule,'" she also supported her
conclusion by arguing that commandeering violated a general principle
of state sovereignty: "Whether one views the take title provision as lying
assume its constitutional responsibility.") (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
177. In the primary dissent, Justice Powell returned to the same state sovereignty
principle that had been invoked by Justices Douglas and Rehnquist before him, and
concluded that the federal government should not be permitted to impose the FLSA's labor
regulations on state employment practices. 469 U.S. at 573-75 (Powell, J., dissenting).
178. One recent case demonstrates that, given the protection of state sovereignty
afforded by the new federalism doctrines, Justice O'Connor has perhaps backed away from
the position that Garcia itself should be overruled. In Franchise Tax Board of California v.
Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488 (2003), the Court, per Justice O'Connor, held that state sovereign
immunity was not constitutionally entitled to full faith and credit in the courts of sister states.
In rejecting a proposed rule that would provide immunity where "core sovereign
responsibilities" are implicated, Justice O'Connor cited to Garcia as support for the
proposition that such a rule would be "unsound in principle and unworkable in practice." See
id. at 498 (quoting Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546-47).
179. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
180. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e.
181. Two of these provisions, which the Court characterized as providing "incentives" to
regulate, were held to be constitutionally permissible. See New York, 505 U.S. at 171-74.
182. See id. at 174-75.
183. Id.
184. See id. at 174 (citing Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., 452 U.S.
264, 288 (1981), and FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 764-65 (1982)).
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outside Congress' [s] enumerated powers, or as infringing upon the core
of the state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, the
provision is inconsistent with the federal structure of our Government
established by the Constitution.,
18 5
The sovereignty/supremacy debate boiled much closer to the surface
in the Court's second anticommandeering case, Printz v. United States.'
16
Printz involved a challenge to the interim provisions of the Brady Act,7
which required state and local law enforcement officers to conduct
background checks on gun purchasers until the Attorney General could
establish a national system.'8 Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court
succinctly framed the issue: "Petitioners here object to being pressed
into federal service, and contend that congressional action compelling
state officers to execute federal laws is unconstitutional.' 89
After examining the issue from a historical perspective, Justice
Scalia turned explicitly to structural analysis, stating: "We turn next to
consideration of the structure of the Constitution, to see if we can
discern among its 'essential postulate[s],' a principle that controls the
present case."'" Of course, the principle he focused on was state
sovereignty. In an analysis reminiscent of Justice Douglas' Griswold
opinion,'9' Justice Scalia built a broad base for the state sovereignty
185. Id. at 177. There are other examples of state sovereignty structural reasoning in
New York as well. For instance, Justice O'Connor directly addressed the extra-textual effect
of the Tenth Amendment:
The Tenth Amendment likewise restrains the power of Congress, but this limit is not
derived from the text of the Tenth Amendment itself, which, as we have discussed, is
essentially a tautology. Instead, the Tenth Amendment confirms that the power of
the Federal Government is subject to limits that may, in a given instance, reserve
power to the States. The Tenth Amendment thus directs us to determine, as in this
case, whether an incident of state sovereignty is protected by a limitation on an
Article I power.
See id. at 156-57.
186. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
187. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (2004).
188. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 902-03.
189. Id. at 905.
190. Id. at 918 (quoting Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934)) (citations
omitted).
191. Several scholars have noted the methodological similarities between Griswold and
the new federalism cases. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 12, at 170-72 (noting the similarity in
reasoning between federalism cases and individual rights cases such as Griswold); Denning &
Reynolds, supra note 32, at 1090 ("The 1995-96 and 1996-97 Terms produced several
decisions that illustrated the extent to which the 'conservative' Rehnquist Court has adopted
interpretive methodologies that, ten or twenty years ago, would have been anathema to self-
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principle by pulling together several related and unrelated constitutional
provisions in which it plays a role:
Although the States surrendered many of their powers to the
new Federal Government, they retained "a residuary and
inviolable sovereignty." This is reflected throughout the
Constitution's text, including (to mention only a few examples)
the prohibition on any involuntary reduction or combination of a
State's territory, Art. IV, § 3; the Judicial Power Clause, Art. III,
§ 2, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Art. IV, § 2, which
speak of the "Citizens" of the States; the amendment provision,
Article V, which requires the votes of three-fourths of the States
to amend the Constitution; and the Guarantee Clause, Art. IV, §
4, which "presupposes the continued existence of the states
and ... those means and instrumentalities which are the creation
of their sovereign and reserved rights." Residual state
sovereignty was also implicit, of course, in the Constitution's
conferral upon Congress of not all governmental powers, but
only discrete, enumerated ones, Art. I, § 8, which implication was
rendered express by the Tenth Amendment's assertion that
"[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people.' '" 2
One incident of this principle, Justice Scalia's opinion reasoned, was that
the Constitution establishes "'two orders of government, each with its
own direct relationship, its own privity... to the people who sustain it
and are governed by it."" 93 Because each government is accountable to
its citizens directly, allowing the federal government to commandeer
state executive officials blurs that line and eviscerates the separate
nature of the two sovereignties.i"
Relying on these and other arguments, the Court held that the
federal government could not command state executive officials to
enforce federal laws.'9 Justice Stevens (joined by Justices Souter,
respecting 'strict constructionists.' In short, conservatives on the Court have embraced what
has been termed 'penumbral reasoning,' of the sort employed in Griswold v. Connecticut.")
(citations omitted).
192. 521 U.S. at 918-19 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
193. Id. at 920 (quoting U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995)
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).
194. See id. at 920-21.
195. See id. at 935 ("The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the
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Ginsburg, and Breyer) dissented,"" countering in part with federal
supremacy structural arguments. He first employed the federal
supremacy principle to rebut the claim that commandeering would
create conflicts for state officials bound to state governments and state
constituencies.9' Invoking the Supremacy Clause in conjunction with
the Oath Clause, which requires that state executive and judicial officers
"be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support [the] Constitution, 198
Justice Stevens argued:
There can be no conflict between their duties to the State and
those owed to the Federal Government because Article VI
unambiguously provides that federal law "shall be the supreme
Law of the Land," binding in every State.... Thus, not only the
Constitution, but every law enacted by Congress as well,
establishes policy for the States just as firmly as do laws enacted
by state legislatures.'99
Justice Stevens once again relied on the extra-textual effect of the
Supremacy Clause in a later argument about the applicability of the
Court's decision in Testa v. Katt.2°° The Testa Court held that a state
court of competent jurisdiction cannot refuse to hear a claim brought
under a federal statute.20' The majority reasoned that Testa was
distinguishable because it was mandated by the clear text of the
Supremacy Clause, which states, "'the Judges in every State Shall be
bound [by federal law]."' 2  Justice Stevens, however, argued that the
Supremacy Clause stands for "far more" than its express "conflict of
laws principle., 203 In his opinion, Testa relied "on the central message of
,,20' hthe entire [Supremacy] Clause, and the same principle should be
applied to state executive officials.
In the debate over Testa and the breadth of the Supremacy Clause,
Justice Stevens wanted to give the Supremacy Clause extra-textual
States to address particular problems, nor command the States' officers, or those of their
political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.").
196. See id. at 939-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
197. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
198. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
199. Printz, 521 U.S. at 943-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
200. 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
201. Id. at 394.
202. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 928-29 (alteration in original).
203. Id. at 968 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 969.
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effect, but the majority chose to confine it to its literal terms. Of course,
the positions of the two sides were reversed as to the Tenth
Amendment. As noted above, Justice Scalia applied it as evocative of a
general principle of state sovereignty, but Justice Stevens, for his part,
preferred a literal interpretation:
Unlike the First Amendment... the Tenth Amendment imposes
no restriction on the exercise of delegated powers.... The
Amendment confirms the principle that the powers of the
Federal Government are limited to those affirmatively granted
by the Constitution, but it does not purport to limit the scope or
the effectiveness of the exercise of powers that are delegated to
Congress. °5
Thus, the pattern that emerged in the regulatory immunity cases was
repeated in the anticommandeering cases. Each side relied on structural
reasoning, and each focused on one constitutional principle while
refusing to credit the one posed by the other side.
C. The Supporting Role of Sovereignty and Supremacy in Defining the
Scope of the Commerce Clause
The second important development of the new federalism has been a
renewed search for judicially enforceable outer limits on congressional
power. In a trio of cases in the late 1930's and early 19 40's,20, the Court
retreated from a long struggle to enforce limits on Congress's power
under the Commerce Clause. 7 Abandoning distinctions between
commercial and noncommercial activity," and direct and indirect effects
on interstate commerce,' the Court finally concluded that Congress
could regulate any activity that, in the aggregate, had a "substantial
effect" on interstate commerce." ' Applying this principle, the Court
upheld a wide range of statutes over the next fifty years, including, for
example, congressional regulation of racial discrimination in places of
public accommodation1 and purely local incidents of loan sharking.
205. Id. at 941-42 (citations omitted).
206. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
207. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
208. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895).
209. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550 (1935).
210. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125.
211. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252-53 (1964);
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In its 1995 decision in United States v. Lopez,213 and its 2000 decision
in United States v. Morrison,214 however, the Rehnquist Court interjected
a new limiting principle into Commerce Clause interpretation. Building
from the axiom that "enumeration presupposes something not
enumerated,.2  and reasoning that the prior substantial effects cases all
involved, in some sense, economic activity, the Court held that Congress
may only regulate economic activity that has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.216 Under this rule, it struck down a federal law
prohibiting the possession of guns near schools in Lopez,2'7 and a federal
law providing a private right of action to victims of gender motivated
violence in Morrison.218
Although most of the arguments in Lopez and Morrison are either
textual or doctrinal, the state sovereignty structural argument once
again played a key role in the discussion. In both cases the Court
argued that a broad theory of substantial effects would allow Congress
to regulate virtually everything, and that such a result would be
incompatible with "our dual system of government. '' "9 For example,
writing for the Court in Morrison, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated:
We accordingly reject the argument that Congress may regulate
noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that
conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce. The
Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national
and what is truly local.... Indeed, we can think of no better
example of the police power, which the Founders denied the
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299-301 (1964).
212. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 155-56 (1971).
213. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
214. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
215. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824).
216. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607-11.
217. 514 U.S. at 559-68.
218. 529 U.S. at 610-19. The Court recently heard arguments in a case that will likely
further define the scope of the Commerce Power. See Ashcroft v. Raich, 124 S.Ct. 2909
(2004) (granting the government's petition for certiorari). The Court will determine whether
Congress has the power to regulate individually cultivated and consumed marijuana, where
expressly permitted under state law for medicinal use. The Ninth Circuit ruled at the
preliminary injunction stage that such regulation was beyond the reach of the Commerce
Clause. Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1227-34 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct.
2909 (2004).
219. 529 U.S. at 608 n.3 ("this Court has always recognized a limit on the commerce
power inherent in 'our dual system of government"') (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 310 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557.
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National Government and reposed in the States, than the
suppression of violent crime and vindication of its victims. 220
Responding to challenges from the dissenting justices, Chief Justice
Rehnquist defended this position by arguing that it was implied from
"the entire structure of the Constitution: ' 221  "With its careful
enumeration of federal powers and explicit statement that all powers
not granted to the Federal Government are reserved, the Constitution
cannot realistically be interpreted as granting the Federal Government
an unlimited license to regulate.
' 22
Like the majority opinions, the dissents in Lopez and Morrison
primarily rely on textual and doctrinal (as well as practical) arguments.
Nonetheless, at important points in their arguments, the dissenters
turned to the federal supremacy principle to help support their position.
For example, the dissenters invoked federal supremacy structuralism in
response to the majority's argument that Congress should not be
allowed to regulate in areas of traditional state concern. 22 Echoing
earlier reasoning in the regulatory immunity and anticommandeering
cases, Justice Souter argued in his Morrison dissent that, under the
principle of federal supremacy, Congress can regulate in any area
encompassed within the Commerce Clause:
The premise that the enumeration of powers implies that other
powers are withheld is sound; the conclusion that some particular
categories of subject matter are therefore presumptively beyond
the reach of the commerce power is, however, a non
sequitur ......
To the contrary, we have always recognized that while the
federal commerce power may overlap the reserved state police
220. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18 (citations omitted).
221. Id. at 618 n.8.
222. Id. For other examples of the sovereignty principle at work in Lopez, see 514 U.S.
at 561 n.3, 564, and Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion, 514 U.S. at 568-83 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). For similar examples in Morrison, see 529 U.S. at 608, 613, 615-16.
223. In both Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564, and Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-16, the majority
invokes the idea that there are areas of traditional state concern and that federal regulation in
such contexts is inherently suspect.
224. 529 U.S. at 639 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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225power, in such cases federal authority is supreme.
Thus, even in these cases, where the battle was fought primarily through
other types of arguments, the dispute about the structure of
federalism-state sovereignty or federal supremacy-played an
important role.226
D. Structural Reasoning in the State Sovereign Immunity Cases
The sovereignty/supremacy debate has played its greatest role in the
final important doctrinal development of the new federalism, the state
sovereign immunity cases. The history of the state sovereign immunity
doctrine is long and complicated, and a full recitation is well beyond the
scope of this analysis.227 However, in order to appreciate the structural
aspects of the modern sovereign immunity cases, it is important to have
some idea of what came before.
The story begins in earnest with the Supreme Court's 1793 decision
in Chisholm v. Georgia."' In Chisholm, a South Carolina citizen sued
Georgia in federal court, invoking the diversity jurisdiction of Article III
to bring a state law assumpsit action.9 The Court found that Georgia
was not immune from such a suit in federal court because the plain
language of Article 11123 provided for federal jurisdiction."' Chisholm
225. Id. at 639 n.12 (internal citations omitted); see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 609-10.
Justice Souter advanced a similar argument in Lopez:
There is no general doctrine implied in the Federal Constitution that the two
governments, national and state, are each to exercise its powers so as not to interfere
with the free and full exercise of the powers of the other. ... [I]t is clear that the
Federal Government, when acting within a delegated power, may override
countervailing state interests.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 609-10 (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 195-96 (1968) (altertions
in original) (internal citations omitted)).
226. In another aspect of the new federalism, the Rehnquist Court has also imposed
limits on Congress's ability to legislate pursuant to its other enumerated powers. For
example, in both City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530-36 (1997) and Morrison, 529 U.S.
at 619-27, the Court enforced limits on Congress's ability to legislate pursuant to § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
227. For a concise history of the development of the state sovereign immunity doctrine,
see Ginger R. Burton, Note, Piercing the State Sovereign Immunity Shield: Utilizing Suit by
the United States on Behalf of Individuals to Provide the Complete Remedy for States'
Violation of Federal Laws Enacted Under Article 1, 37 GA. L. REv. 1401, 1410-22 (2003).
228. 2 U.S. (1 DalI.) 419 (1793).
229. Id.
230. Article III states, in relevant part: "The judicial Power shall extend.., to
Controversies. .. between a State and Citizens of another State." See U.S. CONST. art. III, §
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created a swirl of controversy,232 and in response Congress soon
proposed, and the states quickly ratified, the Eleventh Amendment,
which provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State,
or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. 233
Although the text of the Eleventh Amendment is limited to suits
brought against one state by a citizen of another, and thus is best read
textually as a limit on the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts,2 4
the Amendment was given life well beyond the reach of its text in Hans
v. Louisiana,35 decided in 1890. Relying in part on the now familiar
principle of state sovereignty, the Hans Court found that the Eleventh
Amendment had restored a general rule of state sovereign immunity,
and therefore barred a federal question suit against Louisiana by a
Louisiana citizen.
The Court revisited the sovereign immunity doctrine in a pair of
cases a century later by asking a slightly different question-whether
Congress has the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity through
legislation. The Court first addressed abrogation in the context of
Congress's power pursuant to section five of the Fourteenth
2, cl. 1.
231. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (1 DalI.) at 466 ("'The judicial power of the United States
shall extend to controversies, between a state and citizens of another State.' Could the
strictest legal language... describe, with more precise accuracy, the cause now depending
before the tribunal?") (opinion of Wilson, J.) (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted).
232. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890).
233. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
234. A point acknowledged by many commentators and Supreme Court Justices alike.
See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A
Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition
Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1335 (1983); Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole
Decision and State Sovereign Immunity, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 10-13 (1996); see also
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) ("[T]he text of the Amendment
would appear to restrict only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts .... )
(Rehnquist, J.); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 286--89 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
235. 134 U.S. at 13-15.
236. Id. at 13. The Court stated in Hans:
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an
individual without its consent. This is the general sense and the general practice of
mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed
by the government of every State in the Union.
Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton)) (emphasis omitted).
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Amendment, which grants authority to enforce the Amendment's
substantive provisions, such as the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses.237 Writing for the Court in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 38 then-Justice
Rehnquist held that, when legislating pursuant to section five of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Congress could abrogate state sovereign
immunity and make states liable in damages to individuals for violations
of federal law. To reach that conclusion, he relied heavily on the effect
of the Fourteenth Amendment on the "relationship between the
Federal Government and the States." 39 The Fourteenth Amendment,
he reasoned, was "'intended to be"' a limit on "'the power of the
States"' and an enlargement "'of the power of Congress.' 2 40  He
continued, quoting the Court's decision in Ex parte Virginia:
The prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment are directed to
the States, and they are to a degree restrictions of State power. It
is these which Congress is empowered to enforce, and to enforce
against State action.... Such enforcement is no invasion of State
sovereignty. No law can be, which the people of the States have,
by the Constitution of the United States, empowered Congress to
enact. 4
Fitzpatrick therefore relies on a particular application of the federal
supremacy principle, derived not from the Supremacy Clause or the
Constitution generally, but from the Fourteenth Amendment's direct
limitations on state sovereignty and its empowerment of Congress to
enforce those limits.
242
Thirteen years later, in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,243 the Court
extended the abrogation rule to Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause. Justice Brennan, writing for a plurality of four justices,2
reasoned that like the Fourteenth Amendment, the Commerce Clause is
both a grant of legislative power to Congress and a concurrent limitation
237. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
238. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
239. Id. at 453.
240. Id. at 454 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1880)).
241. Id. (quoting Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 346-47).
242. Id. at 456.
243. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
244. Justice White concurred, but noted that although he agreed "with the conclusion
reached by Justice Brennan," he did "not agree with much of his reasoning." Id. at 57 (White,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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on the sovereignty of the states.2 45 Thus, by generalizing the supremacy
theme in Fitzpatrick to Congress's Article I powers, he concluded that
Congress could abrogate state sovereign immunity by legislating
pursuant to the Commerce Clause.
Although Fitzpatrick remains good law,2' Union Gas quickly became
a casualty of the overriding interest in state sovereignty that has
characterized the new federalism. It lasted only seven years before
being overruled in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,247 which held
that Congress did not have the power to abrogate state sovereign
immunity when legislating pursuant to its Article I powers, such as the
Commerce Clause.' The decision in Seminole Tribe relies heavily on
the Eleventh Amendment, but Chief Justice Rehnquist candidly
admitted that the text itself was not controlling, going so far as to call
the text of the Eleventh Amendment a "straw man. 2 49  Instead, the
Amendment was important as the textual embodiment of the principle
of state sovereign immunity:
It was well established in 1989 when Union Gas was decided that
245. Id. at 16-17 ("Like the Fourteenth Amendment, the Commerce Clause with one
hand gives power to Congress while, with the other, it takes power away from the States. It
cannot be relevant that the Fourteenth Amendment accomplishes this exchange in two
steps.., while the Commerce Clause does it in one." (internal citations omitted)). For the
latter principle, Justice Brennan relied primarily on the dormant Commerce Clause cases. Id.
at 20.
246. The Court recently reaffirmed Fitzpatrick's abrogation rule for statutes passed
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment in Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S.
721 (2003) (holding that Congress validly enacted the Family Medical Leave Act pursuant to
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore that it successfully abrogated state
sovereign immunity). Its applicability has been greatly constrained, however, because, in
another aspect of the new federalism, the Court has limited Congress's ability to legislate
pursuant to § 5 power. See Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365-74
(2001) (Americans with Disabilities Act not a valid exercise of § 5 power, and therefore
unable to abrogate state sovereign immunity); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 80-
92 (2000) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act not a valid exercise of § 5 power, and
therefore unable to abrogate state sovereign immunity); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed.
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 636-48 (1999) (Patent and Plant Variety
Protection Remedy Clarification Act not a valid exercise of § 5 power, and therefore unable
to abrogate state sovereign immunity); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530-36 (1997)
(legislation passed pursuant to § 5 power must be proportional and congruent to state
constitutional violations that Congress seeks to remedy).
247. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
248. The decision in Seminole Tribe deals specifically with Congress's power under the
Indian Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, but the Court was clear that its
decision applied to all Congress's Article I powers, including the Interstate Commerce
Clause. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72.
249. Id. at 69.
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the Eleventh Amendment stood for the constitutional principle
that state sovereign immunity limited the federal courts'
jurisdiction under Article III.... And our decisions since Hans
had been equally clear that the Eleventh Amendment reflects
"the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity [that] limits
the grant of judicial authority in Art. III. ' '" °
Although this passage demonstrates that Seminole Tribe relies on
structural reasoning, it is important to note that sovereign immunity
itself is employed as a constitutional principle, and the Eleventh
Amendment itself is given extra-textual effect. The broader state
sovereignty theme does play a supporting role in Seminole Tribe,251 but
the primary structural argument relies directly on the Eleventh
Amendment and sovereign immunity.
In Alden v. Maine252 the Court extended the reach of state sovereign
immunity to state courts, holding that Congress does not have the power
to make states subject to suit in their own courts when legislating
pursuant to its Article I powers. Perhaps because the decision moved
even further from the text of the Eleventh Amendment, which is
directed at the jurisdiction of the federal courts, Justice Kennedy's
majority opinion in Alden relied heavily on the general state sovereignty
principle. In fact, he began his analysis by building the state sovereignty
principle from the text of the Constitution:
Although the Constitution establishes a National Government
with broad, often plenary authority over matters within its
recognized competence, the founding document "specifically
recognizes the States as sovereign entities." Various textual
provisions of the Constitution assume the States' continued
existence and active participation in the fundamental processes
of governance. The limited and enumerated powers granted to
the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Branches of the National
Government, moreover, underscore the vital role reserved to the
States by the constitutional design. Any doubt regarding the
constitutional role of the States as sovereign entities is removed
250. Id. at 64 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 97-98
(1984)) (alteration in original).
251. Id. at 68 ("'Behind the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which
limit and control.... There is... the postulate that States of the Union, still possessing
attributes of sovereignty, shall be immune from suits. ) (quoting Monaco v. Mississippi,
292 U.S. 313, 321-23 (1934)).
252. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
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by the Tenth Amendment.... The Amendment confirms the
promise implicit in the original document: "The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.,
253
After concluding based on this analysis that the states retain "'a
residuary and inviolable sovereignty, '  Justice Kennedy applied his
principle to derive the sovereign immunity rule: "sovereign immunity
derives not from the Eleventh Amendment but from the structure of the
original Constitution itself.,
255
In response, the dissenters in the sovereign immunity cases turned to
the federal supremacy principle that they had championed in the
anticommandeering and Commerce Clause cases. Although it can be
lost amidst his comprehensive eighty-five page confrontation of the
majority's reasoning on textual, historical, and practical grounds, the
best example of federal supremacy structural reasoning is found in
Justice Souter's Seminole Tribe256 dissent. He argued that through the
Constitution, the People divided sovereignty between the federal
government and the states. Where the Constitution granted
sovereignty to the federal government, it was withheld from the states.
2 8
Therefore, when acting pursuant to its delegated powers, Congress is
free to abrogate sovereign immunity:
[T]he ratification demonstrated that state governments were
subject to a superior regime of law in a judicial system
established, not by the State, but by the people through a specific
delegation of their sovereign power to a National Government
that was paramount within its delegated sphere.259
Putting it another way, he stated: "[T]he adoption of the Constitution
253. Id. at 713-14 (citations omitted).
254. Id. at 715 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison)).
255. Id. at 728. In its most recent expansion of the sovereign immunity doctrine, the
Court held that sovereign immunity applied equally to adjudications in federal administrative
agencies. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. South Carolina, 535 U.S. 743 (2003). The Court in
Federal Maritime Commission relied on Alden's reasoning, and derived sovereign immunity
from the general principle of state sovereignty. Id. at 751-53.
256. 517 U.S. at 100-85 (Souter, J., dissenting).
257. See id.
258. Id. at 150-55.
259. Id. at 153-54.
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made [the states] members of a novel federal system that sought to
balance the States' exercise of some sovereign prerogatives delegated
from their own people with the principle of a limited but centralizing
federal supremacy."2 ''
As in the regulatory immunity and anticommandeering cases, each
side was willing to give either the Tenth Amendment or the Supremacy
Clause broad extra-textual effect, but neither considered the possibility
that both clauses warranted an expansive interpretation. For example,
in Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina,261 which extends the
sovereign immunity rule to adjudications before federal administrative
agencies, Justice Breyer's dissent constrained the Tenth Amendment to
its literal terms:
The Court's principle lacks any firm anchor in the Constitution's
text.... The Tenth Amendment cannot help. It says: "The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." The Constitution has "delegated
to the United States" the power here in question, the power "[t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States."2 62
Similarly, though willing to give extra-textual effect to the Tenth
Amendment to help derive the state sovereignty principle in Alden,
Justice Kennedy discounted arguments that the Supremacy Clause,
invoked through the exercise of Congress's Article I powers, could
override state sovereign immunity: "As is evident from its text, however,
the Supremacy Clause enshrines as 'the supreme law of the Land' only
those Federal Acts that accord with the constitutional design. Appeal to
the Supremacy Clause alone merely raises the question whether a law is
a valid exercise of the national power."' '
260. Id. at 150. The dissenters also invoked the federal supremacy principle in other
sovereign immunity cases. For example, Justice Souter reprised his split sovereignty
argument in his Alden dissent, 527 U.S. at 799-800, and Justice Stevens invoked the
Supremacy Clause as a partial answer to sovereign immunity in Kimel v. Florida Board of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 96 (2000).
261. 535 U.S. 743 (2003)
262. Id. at 777 (citations omitted).
263. Id. at 731 (internal citation omitted).
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V. RESOLVING THE SOVEREIGNTY/SUPREMACY DEBATE: WHO HAS
THE BETTER STRUCTURAL ARGUMENT?
The new federalism cases, and their immediate predecessors
concerning state regulatory immunity, show a clear fissure within the
Court over the proper structural view of federalism. One side, in the
majority for the last fifteen years, sees federalism through the lens of a
state sovereignty principle derived in large part from the Tenth
Amendment." The other, in dissent throughout the recent "federalist
revival" after prevailing in Garcia, focuses instead on a federal
supremacy principle grounded in the Supremacy Clause.6 ' Having
analyzed the cases, it is now possible to address in context the question
raised at the outset-who has the better structural argument? A close
analysis of their positions shows that both have strong arguments, but
that neither presents a comprehensive view of the Constitution's
structure. Federalism, as created by our Constitution, is not primarily
premised on either state sovereignty or federal supremacy, but is instead
a careful balance between the two. As James Madison stated in The
Federalist No. 39: "The proposed Constitution, therefore,... is, in
strictness, neither a national nor a federal Constitution, but a
composition of both."2 6
A. The Constitution's Approach to the Sovereignty/Supremacy Debate:
A Balanced Conception of Federalism
Viewed in isolation, it is hard to fault the principle relied on by
either side in this running debate. The concept of state sovereignty is
implicit, not just in the Tenth Amendment and the enumeration of
powers, but in myriad other aspects of the Constitution noted by the
majority opinions in Printz 26' and Alden.268 Likewise, as noted by Justice
264. Vicki Jackson has described this aspect of the new federalism as an "assertion of a
purportedly clear founding vision, a vision in which the emphasis is less on the supremacy of
federal law and more on maintaining a balance of powers between the states and the national
government." Jackson, supra note 125, at 235.
265. Of course, this debate is not a modern creation, nor has it been fought solely in the
federal courts. The question of the proper balance between the states and the federal
government has been with us since the ratification debates, and was in many ways responsible
for the Civil War. For a detailed discussion of the historical sovereignty/supremacy debate
both during ratification and thereafter in the Supreme Court, see H. Jefferson Powell, The
Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633, 652-81 (1993).
266. THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison).
267. 521 U.S. 898, 918-21 (1997).
268. 527 U.S. 706, 713-15 (1999).
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Brennan's dissent in National League of Cities,26 9 and Justice Souter's
Seminole Tribe dissent,27 the federal supremacy principle is evidenced
both by the Supremacy Clause and the Constitution's division of
authority between the federal government and the states. However, if
both are right to derive the principle upon which they rely, each must
also be wrong in failing to recognize that their principle is moderated by
the countervailing theme advanced by the other side.
In fact, a curious similarity between the Tenth Amendment and the
Supremacy Clause confirms that both are particularly amenable to
extra-textual interpretation; both the Supremacy Clause and the Tenth
Amendment are commonly understood as textually unnecessary. For
example, in United States v. Darby,27' the Court stated that the Tenth
Amendment:
states but a truism that all is retained which has not been
surrendered. There is nothing in the history of its adoption to
suggest that it was more than declaratory of the relationship
between the national and state governments as it had been
established by the Constitution before the amendment.272
Similarly, discussing the Supremacy Clause, Alexander Hamilton
wrote in The Federalist No. 33:
[I]t may be affirmed with perfect confidence that the
constitutional operation of the intended government would be
precisely the same, if [the Supremacy Clause] were entirely
obliterated as if [it] were repeated in every article. [It is] only
declaratory of a truth which would have resulted by necessary
and unavoidable implication from the very act of constituting a
federal government and vesting it with certain specified
powers.
269. 426 U.S. 833, 859-61 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
270. 517 U.S. 44, 150-54 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting).
271. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
272. Id. at 124; see also TRIBE, supra note 16, at 860 ("In most of these cases, however,
the Court treated [the Tenth A]mendment not as expressing an independent constraint on
federal power, but simply as stating the corollary to the proposition that federal power is
indeed limited. The idea was that any powers not delegated to the federal government were,
ipso facto, reserved to the states and their people .... "); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 157 (1992) (arguing that textual command of Tenth Amendment is "essentially a
tautology").
273. THE FEDERALIST No. 33 (Alexander Hamilton). Former Chief Justice Marshall's
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In other words, the particular rules stated in the Tenth Amendment and
the Supremacy Clause are assumed by larger organizing themes implicit
in the Constitution's design. Because each provision represents a
particular textual manifestation of a larger principle, both are
convincing textual platforms for invoking their larger themes.
As noted in the cases, however, each side trumpets one provision
and downplays the other. By taking that approach, both have
committed the error the Court so carefully avoided in Youngstown. Just
as an executive power theme should be balanced against other themes in
the Constitution to derive the overarching separation of powers
principle,274 the state sovereignty theme and the federal supremacy
theme must be balanced against one another to derive the Constitution's
proper conception of federalism. 75 Although, as the often vigorous
debates in the separation of powers cases can attest, it may not always
be facially apparent how the balanced principle should apply to a given
question, it is important that the Court address federalism cases with the
balanced conception of federalism in mind. Focusing exclusively on
state sovereignty or federal supremacy is simply to presume an answer a
fortiori, without ever engaging the Constitution's true structure.
At first glance, it is difficult to see how state sovereignty and federal
supremacy can be balanced against one another. They are, after all,
diametrically opposed-how can the federal government be supreme if
opinion in Marbury also treats the Supremacy Clause as confirmatory of a principle implicit
in the remainder of the Constitution. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 180.
274. See supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
275. Commenting on the structural debate between Justice Kennedy and Justice Souter
in Alden, Lackland H. Bloom, Jr. has similarly argued that both conceptions of federalism are
in some sense right. See Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Interpretive Issues in Seminole and Alden,
55 SMU L. REV. 377, 391 (2002). Professor Bloom writes:
The question is: who is correct, and how can we tell? The answer is, both are
correct, at least in the abstract. Each conception of federal structure has a textual,
theoretical, and historical pedigree and finds significant support in practice and
precedent. Both make sense. If Justice Souter's conception is given complete free
reign, especially in view of the enormous expansion of federal power over the past
two centuries, there will be little, if anything, left of state sovereignty. If Justice
Kennedy's conception is taken to the extreme, the States will be able to effectively
block significant national objectives. Neither vision is completely acceptable. Both
are essential.
Id. For Professor Bloom, because both the sovereignty and supremacy views are correct, the
Court should look to see which is better supported by other interpretive methodologies in any
given case. Id. By balancing the two principles against one another, however, this apparent
conflict can be resolved as a structural matter, without reference to other methodologies.
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the states are sovereign, and the states sovereign if the federal
government is supreme? Fortunately, the Constitution provides
significant guidance in finding the proper demarcation between these
competing themes. The constitutional apparatus for achieving balance
is the limitation on federal supremacy, and concurrent reservation of
state sovereignty, inherent in the enumeration of federal power.
Although the Supremacy Clause makes any law "made in Pursuance" of
the Constitution the "supreme Law of the Land, 2 76 the Constitution
only provides Congress with the authority to legislate in certain
enumerated areas.2 " It follows that the federal government is supreme,
but only when acting within its limited sphere of authority. States, on
the other hand, retain sovereign authority,278 but only in areas in which
the federal government has not been given the power to legislate, and is
not, therefore, supreme. 9
Read textually as individual clauses, neither the Supremacy Clause
nor the Tenth Amendment answer the questions posed in the new
federalism cases. Whether a law abrogating state sovereign immunity is
made "in pursuance" of the Constitution, after all, is not self-evident,
unless one rejects the possibility of structural (or even historical)
interpretation altogether."l Read together, however, these aspects of
276. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See Bradford R. Clark, The Supremacy Clause as a
Constraint on Federal Power, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 91, 119-124 (2003) (arguing that the
"made in Pursuance" language is a constraint on federal power because it limits federal
supremacy to areas within Congress's enumerated powers).
277. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
278. A result ensured by the literal text of the Tenth Amendment: "The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
279. Other commentators have noted that this interaction between the supremacy clause
and the limitation on federal power inherent in the enumeration of powers and the Tenth
Amendment provides the proper lens through which to address the scope of federalism. See
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Methods of Interpreting the Commerce Clause: A Comparative
Analysis, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1185, 1190 (2003) (stating that it is "obviously correct that the
Constitution confers on Congress only certain enumerated powers and reserves the rest to the
states. But the flip side of the coin is that where Congress has been granted an express power,
it may be exercised to its fullest extent and preempt any contrary state laws," and calling this
interaction a "fundamental tenet of constitutional structure"); Young, supra note 14 at 1671
(stating "[tihe federal government, in other words, is 'sovereign' only within its delegated
sphere of activity, and conversely the states are 'sovereign' only within the scope of their
reserved powers," and concluding that Alden is "profoundly wrong on the merits"); see also
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550 (1985) (stating that the
"limitation on federal authority inherent in the delegated nature of Congress'[s] Article I
powers" is a "principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the States in the
federal system").
280. At least one commentator has taken this position. Scott Fruehwald has argued that
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the Constitution help to illustrate its balanced approach to federalism,
and indicate where the federal government should be supreme and
where the states should be sovereign.
Before rethinking the new federalism cases in light of the balanced
view of state sovereignty and federal supremacy, it is important to pause
briefly and address the argument that the Court already approaches
federalism questions with this balance in mind. One-might point out, for
example, that there are limitations built into the general sovereign
immunity rule.81 Fitzpatrick,282 for one, permits Congress to abrogate
state sovereign immunity under section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and Ex parte Young283 permits suits for prospective relief
against state officers. It is certainly true that there has been some
balance in outcomes-Garcia 2' definitively proves that point. This does
not mean, however, that the Court is engaging a holistic structural view
of federalism that balances state sovereignty and federal supremacy. In
Garcia, for example, neither side discussed the importance of a balanced
approach to federalism; the narrow federal supremacy view simply had
more votes. In other instances, such as the Ex parte Young doctrine,
the best explanation may be that the Court is merely adhering to a
longstanding precedent.2 6
In other cases, the Court has explicitly drawn on the image of
the three new federalism categories discussed can all be resolved as a textual matter. State
sovereign immunity and anticommandeering doctrine are unprincipled, he argues, because
the Supremacy Clause controls in the absence of a specific textual rule. See Scott Fruehwald,
The Principled and Unprincipled Grounds of the New Federalism: A Call for Detachment in
the Constitutional Adjudication of Federalism, 53 MERCER L. REV. 811, 852-65 (2002). While
interesting, this argument ignores not only 200 years of Supreme Court jurisprudence looking
to the Constitution's structure for guidance, but also a fundamental aspect of written
constitutionalism. As former Chief Justice Marshall explained in McCulloch, a constitution,
by its nature, "requires that only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects
designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those objects, be deduced from the
nature of the objects themselves." 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 407.
281. See William E. Thro, That Those Limits May Not be Forgotten: An Explanation of
Dual Sovereignty, 12 WIDENER L.J. 567, 580-82 (2003) (discussing aspects of sovereign
immunity law that provide some balance between state sovereignty and the interest in the
supremacy of federal law).
282. 427 U.S. 445.
283. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
284. 469 U.S. 528.
285. See generally id.
286. See, e.g., Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635 (2002)
(unanimously affirming application of the Ex parte Young doctrine without any discussion of
the underlying policy or the need to balance state sovereignty and the supremacy of federal
law).
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"balance" between the federal government and the states. For example,
in Gregory v. Ashcroft,' a 1991 case finding that the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act does not apply to state judges,
Justice O'Connor asserted the importance of maintaining "a proper
balance between the States and the Federal Government."2  Similarly,
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Lopez states: "the federal
balance is too essential a part of our constitutional structure and plays
too vital a role in securing freedom for us to admit inability to intervene
when one or the other level of Government has tipped the scales too
far."'2 89 In practice, however, this is not the principle that is actually
applied in the new federalism cases. Instead, as we have seen, each side
pursues a narrow vision, premised solely on either state sovereignty or
federal supremacy, not a balance between the two. Where each side
reads either the Tenth Amendment or the Supremacy Clause extra-
textually and concurrently seeks to limit the countervailing provision to
its literal text, even explicit talk about "balance" is little more than lip
service.
B. Applying the Balanced View of Sovereignty and Supremacy to the
New Federalism Cases
Having concluded that both sides have failed to capture the proper
structural conception of federalism, one important question remains to
be addressed: Applying the balanced view, how should the new
federalism cases have been resolved? If, as I have argued, the balance
between state sovereignty and federal supremacy must be derived
primarily from the limits on the scope of federal power, the state
regulatory immunity, sovereign immunity, and anticommandeering
cases all appear easy. No one in the regulatory immunity cases, for
example, argued that Congress did not have the power to enact the
FLSA.29 Similarly, in the sovereign immunity cases, the question was
not whether Congress had the power to enact the underlying statutes,
but whether it could make states liable in private suits for violating
them. 291 As for the Anticommandeering cases, Justice O'Connor flatly
stated in New York that "[r]egulation of the.., market in [radioactive]
287. 501 U.S. 452, 459 (1991).
288. Id.
289. 514 U.S. 549, 578 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Jackson, supra note 125,
at 235 (discussing a balance theme in the new federalism cases).
290. See generally Garcia, 469 U.S. 528.
291. See generally Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (involving the FLSA as well).
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waste disposal is... well within Congress'[s] authority under the
Commerce Clause."29' Because Congress was acting within the scope of
a delegated power, the presumption is that federal supremacy should
trump state sovereignty. This presumption, however, must be
considered in light of the relative weight of the state sovereignty and
federal supremacy interests at issue in a given case. In certain
circumstances, even though Congress may be acting within the scope of
an enumerated power, a strong interest in state sovereignty could
control where there is no significant countervailing interest in federal
supremacy.
When analyzed in light of this additional consideration, the
anticommandeering cases become significantly different from the
regulatory and sovereign immunity cases. Both the regulatory and
sovereign immunity cases involve Congress subjecting states to
regulation under its enumerated powers-in other words the states are
being regulated, along with others, as actors participating in interstate
commerce (or economic activity substantially affecting interstate
commerce). For example, in Alden Congress had attempted to make
states liable on equal terms with other employers for violating the
FLSA.293 In the anticommandeering cases, on the other hand, the issue
is whether Congress can employ the states as instruments in its
regulatory activity. For example, in New York29' Congress sought to
force states to provide for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste,
and in Printz295 Congress sought to compel state law enforcement
officers to administer a federal regulatory scheme. Although Congress
was prevented from directing the states as instrumentalities of its power,
it was in no way impeded from controlling all participants engaging in
the regulated activity.
This is a key distinction with important implications for the balance
between state sovereignty and federal supremacy. 29' The Constitution
292. 505 U.S. 144, 160 (1992); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 902-03
(1997) (the Brady Act, at issue in Printz, attempted to employ state law enforcement officers
in the regulation of hand gun sales).
293. 527 U.S. at 711-12; see also Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360-
61 (2001) (addressing applicability of Americans with Disabilities Act remedies to states as
employers).
294. 505 U.S. at 174-77.
295. 521 U.S. at 902-03.
296. Seminole Tribe is an important exception to this general statement. Seminole Tribe
dealt with a provision of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act that subjected states to suit by
tribal governments for failing to negotiate in good faith over the development of casinos on
tribal lands. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996). This is quite different
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grants Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce. Because
states are significant participants in the economy,2" Congress would be
effectively denied full control over this enumerated power if it could not
subject states to regulation on equal terms with private actors.298 The
regulatory and sovereign immunity paradigms, therefore, directly
implicate a core premise of the supremacy principle-the fulfillment of
Congress'[s] enumerated powers. 99  The anticommandeering rule,
however, does not in any way prevent Congress from regulating
pursuant to its enumerated powers; it merely prevents Congress from
employing the states as instruments in its regulatory efforts. The
supremacy interest, therefore, is significantly less important in the
anticommandeering paradigm.
On the other side of the equation, congressional commandeering
implicates a key element of state sovereignty that the regulatory and
sovereign immunity cases do not-separateness. The federal
government and the states are separate entities, accountable to, and
deriving their sovereign authority from, distinct polities. The states
from the facts at issue in cases like Alden, 527 U.S. at 711-12, and Garrett, 531 U.S. at 360-61,
which involved congressional attempts to subject states to regulations (and enforcement
through private suit) generally within the ambit of the commerce power. For purposes of this
analysis, therefore, Seminole Tribe may be more similar to the anticommandeering cases than
to the other sovereign immunity cases.
297. For example, according to statistics from the United States Census Bureau, state
governments employ approximately 5,072,130 employees nationwide, with a monthly payroll
of $14,837,809,127. U.S. Census Bureau, State Gov't Employment and Payroll, March 2002,
Summary Table, available at http://ftp2.census.gov/govs/apes/02stus.txt.
298. In fact, that is the result of the state sovereign immunity cases. Under current
doctrine, Congress does not have the power to subject the states to the same enforcement
mechanisms as other employers. See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 711-12; Garrett, 531 U.S. at 360-
61.
299. As Alexander Hamilton stated in The Federalist No. 33:
But it is said that the laws of the Union are to be the supreme law of the land. What
inference can be drawn from this, or what would they amount to, if they were not to
be supreme? It is evident they would amount to nothing. A LAW, by the very
meaning of the term, includes supremacy. It is a rule which those to whom it is
prescribed are bound to observe. This results from every political association. If
individuals enter into a state of society, the laws of that society must be the supreme
regulator of their conduct. If a number of political societies enter into a larger
political society, the laws which the latter may enact, pursuant to the powers
intrusted to it by its constitution, must necessarily be supreme over those societies
and the individuals of whom they are composed.
THE FEDERALIST No. 33 (Alexander Hamilton).
300. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 803 (1995) (holding that the
federal government owes its allegiance to the people of the United States as a whole, not the
various peoples of the individual states).
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are subject to regulation in areas where the federal government is
supreme, but they are not subunits of the federal government, and
treating them as such creates its own set of problems. As Justice
O'Connor persuasively argued in New York, congressional
commandeering allows the federal government to obscure
accountability for its regulatory decisions:
If the citizens of New York, for example, do not consider that
making provision for the disposal of radioactive waste is in their
best interest, they may elect state officials who share their view.
That view can always be pre-empted under the Supremacy
Clause if it is contrary to the national view, but in such a case it is
the Federal Government that makes the decision in full view of
the public, and it will be federal officials that suffer the
consequences if the decision turns out to be detrimental or
unpopular. But where the federal government directs the States
to regulate, it may be the state officials who will bear the brunt of
public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the
regulatory program may remain insulated from the electoral
ramifications of their decision.3°1
Although the primary constitutional mechanism for preserving the
balance between state sovereignty and federal supremacy is the
limitation on the scope of federal power, a proper balanced approach
must also include an analysis of the supremacy and sovereignty interests
at issue in a given case. Application of the balanced structural approach
will usually hold that when Congress is acting within the scope of a
federal power, the supremacy interests will prevail. But the principle's
application in the anticommandeering cases shows that this is not always
true. Because congressional commandeering does not further primary
supremacy interests, but does implicate strong state sovereignty
concerns, a balanced structural approach to federalism would support
the Court's anticommandeering rule, despite the fact that Congress is
acting within the scope of its enumerated powers. Regulatory and
sovereign immunity, on the other hand, do implicate important
supremacy concerns. In those cases, therefore, the presumption
accorded legislation enacted pursuant to Congress'[s] enumerated
powers should control. The scope of federal power inquiry, therefore, is
best conceived as an imperfect approximation of the Constitution's
301. 505 U.S. 168-9 (internal citations omitted); see also Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898, 902-03 (1997).
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attempt to balance state sovereignty against federal supremacy.
That leaves the Commerce Clause cases, where the Court was asked
to determine whether Congress had acted within the scope of its
delegated powers. Obviously, where the scope of federal power is itself
the question before the Court, assessing whether Congress has exceeded
its enumerated powers cannot be the threshold inquiry. Nonetheless,
the fact that the sovereignty/supremacy balance is primarily maintained
through limits on the scope of congressional authority is an important
indirect consideration. Citing a long line of precedents dating back to
the New Deal and even the Marshall Court, the dissenters in Lopez3°2
and Morrison3. 3 argued that the Commerce Clause should be read to
grant Congress the power to regulate any activity that "significantly" or
"substantially" affects interstate commerce. Proceeding from that
premise, they argued that because the cumulative effect of guns in
schools (Lopez) and violence against women (Morrison) has a
substantial impact on interstate commerce, Congress should be free to
address these activities through the commerce power. This is a textually
plausible reading of the Commerce Clause-the power to regulate
interstate commerce could certainly be taken to imply the power to
regulate anything that has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce 304--and was supported by a long string of cases relying on the
"substantial effects" test.05  Under this broad theory of substantial
effects, however, there is virtually no limit on the reach of congressional
power. As Justice Breyer stated in his Morrison dissent: "[w]e live in a
Nation knit together by two centuries of scientific, technological,
commercial, and environmental change. Those changes, taken together,
mean that virtually every kind of activity, no matter how local,
genuinely can affect commerce, or its conditions, outside the State-at
302. 514 U.S. 549, 615 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
303. 529 U.S. 598, 628 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
304. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942). The Court stated in
Wickard, for example:
But even if appellee's activity be local and though it may not be regarded as
commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a
substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and this irrespective of whether
such effect is what might at some earlier time have been defined as "direct" or
"indirect."
Id.
305. See, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., 452 U.S. 264, 277
(1981); Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125.
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least when considered in the aggregate." If Congress can regulate
anything that has a substantial effect on interstate commerce, and every
type of activity has such an effect, the Commerce power is essentially a
grant of plenary authority.3 7 This may be an acceptable textual or
doctrinal interpretation, but it squarely contradicts the balanced
structural view of federalism. If state sovereignty is primarily protected
by limitations on congressional power, it cannot be that Congress has
virtually unlimited power. Because some limitation on the substantial
effects rule is necessary to protect state sovereignty, Lopez and
Morrison were correctly decided.3"
Looking only at outcomes, it seems the Court has done a fairly good
job of applying the balanced view of state sovereignty and federal
supremacy. Of the four doctrinal areas I have addressed with that
approach in mind, only one, state sovereign immunity, should have been
decided differently. Although this may indicate that the balanced view
is at work behind the scenes, addressing it explicitly could have avoided
the over-reliance on state sovereignty in the sovereign immunity cases,
and could help both sides avoid over-reliance on preferred principles in
future cases. Structural reasoning can be a useful tool in constitutional
interpretation, but as with any approach it must be done well. A holistic
structural view of federalism requires that state sovereignty and federal
supremacy be balanced against one another, not invoked in isolation.
306. 529 U.S. at 660 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
307. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564.
The Government admits, under its "costs of crime" reasoning, that Congress could
regulate not only all violent crime, but all activities that might lead to violent crime,
but all activities that might lead to violent crime, regardless of how tenuously they
relate to interstate commerce. Similarly, under the Government's "national
productivity" reasoning, Congress could regulate any activity that it found was
related to the economic productivity of individual citizens.... Thus, if we were to
accept the Government's arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any activity by an
individual that Congress is without power to regulate.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
308. I do not mean to argue that the balanced structural view of federalism dictates the
specific limits of the commerce power. As Grant Nelson and Robert Pushaw, Jr., have noted,
broad structural theories of federalism do not speak to the precise contours of the commerce
power. See Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause:
Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State
Control Over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1, 96-100 (1999). The balanced structural view
of federalism simply requires that there be some limit on the commerce power.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Beginning with opinions by Chief Justice John Marshall in the late
1700's, the Supreme Court has long employed structural reasoning as an
interpretive tool in its constitutional cases. It should be no surprise,
then, that structural arguments have played a key role in the Court's
recent federalism cases. The use of structuralism in the new federalism
is not itself unwelcome-structuralism is a perfectly legitimate
interpretive methodology, balancing the need for flexibility with respect
for the Constitution's text. A good structural argument, however,
requires attentiveness to the entire document to ensure that any
principle derived from the text fairly represents the Constitution as a
whole. Neither the majority nor the dissenters have adhered to this rule;
and as a consequence, both have failed to capture the true (or complete)
structure of federalism set out in the Constitution, which requires a
careful balancing act between state sovereignty and federal supremacy.
Instead, each side invokes one of these countervailing principles while
ignoring the other. Although the Court's tunnel vision has only led to
one significant misstep-the state sovereign immunity doctrine-both
the majority and the dissenters should avoid similar overreaching in the
future by balancing state sovereignty and federal supremacy against one
another when considering federalism questions.
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